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Emphasizing the Copy in Copyright:
Why Noncopying Alterations Do Not Prepare Infringing
Derivative Works
I. INTRODUCTION
Utilizing new digital editing technologies, an infant industry began
supplying home-video consumers with the option of viewing edited
versions of popular movies. These “sanitized” versions removed content
deemed objectionable by some consumers, including profanity, sexual
content, and violence. Many within the motion picture industry,
however, found such unauthorized editing to be objectionable. Fearing
that the motion picture industry would bring a lawsuit to end their
business operation, a franchisee of the popular video-editing company
CleanFlicks sued sixteen Hollywood directors for declaratory relief.1
Before long, many major motion picture studios came to the defense of
the directors, countersuing the entire home-video-editing industry for,
inter alia, copyright infringement. Some home-video editors, however,
never copied the original motion pictures in order to provide edited
versions—instead they produced filters that altered copies of the original
movies during real-time playback—making claims of copyright
infringement unintuitive. Displeased with the edited affect, regardless of
the noncopying method employed, the motion picture studios alleged that
video filterers infringed their copyrights by preparing derivative works2
of their protected movies. Conflicting precedent regarding other
noncopying alterations made resolution of the case unpredictable. Before
the district court reached a ruling on motions for summary judgment, the

1. See Second Amended Complaint at 5–6, Huntsman v. Soderbergh (D. Colo. filed Oct. 28,
2002)
(No.
02-M-1662),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
copyright/cflixstud102802cmp.pdf.
2. Derivative works are works based upon one or more preexisting works. See 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2000). For instance, a motion picture based upon a book is a derivative work of that book. The
1976 Copyright Act granted copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based
upon their copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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issue became moot when Congress enacted the Family Movie Act of
2005,3 which expressly authorizes video-filtering technologies.4
Litigation over video filtering is the most recent addition to a
growing list of unpredictable controversies arising from noncopying
alterations of copyrighted works. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act
(hereinafter “Act” or “1976 Act”), courts consistently rejected attempts
to prohibit mere unauthorized alterations of protected works unless there
was evidence that those works were copied5 in one form or another.
Since the 1976 Act, however, some courts have prohibited unauthorized
alterations even absent any evidence of copying, finding that these
noncopying alterations infringed the exclusive right of copyright owners
to prepare derivative works. Although rudimentary forms of the
derivative right date back to the 1870 Copyright Act, the 1976 Act
redefined the right very broadly, granting copyright owners the right to
prohibit the creation of any work based upon the owners’ preexisting
works. Relying on this broad definition of the Act, plaintiffs have alleged
that respective defendants created derivative works merely by altering
lawfully purchased copies of a work or by manufacturing component
devices that alter the appearance of a work in real time. Defendants in
these cases have included commercial art stores, video-game and other
toy producers, clothing manufacturers, software engineers, webpage
advertisers, and, most recently, home-video filterers.
Although evidence of copying is elementary to copyright
infringement in general, no court deciding a noncopying-alteration case
has specifically addressed whether evidence of copying is necessary to
prove infringement of the derivative right. Courts have addressed,
instead, various other issues, which has resulted in confusing and
contradictory federal case law. Supreme Court review is ripe in order to
resolve conflicting decisions among the circuit courts and to avoid
special congressional intervention, such as the Family Movie Act of
2005. To remedy the current dilemma, courts must directly address

3. Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110,
15 U.S.C. § 1114).
4. For more on the home-video editing/filtering controversy, see infra notes 258–272 and
accompanying text.
5. The term “copied,” as used here and throughout this Comment, does not necessarily
mean “reproduced.” A work may be copied without producing a copy of it. For instance, a motion
picture might copy the characters, plots, and dialogues from a novel without ever reproducing a copy
of the book.
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whether unauthorized, noncopying alterations prepare infringing
derivative works. This Comment concludes that there is no infringement
of a copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works unless
the defendant copied the owner’s copyrighted work or its elements.
Part II describes the gradual expansion of copyright, which has led to
the current controversy over whether noncopying alterations prepare
infringing derivative works. Part III examines the judicial treatment of
noncopying alterations both before and after the 1976 Act, focusing on
the increasingly divergent decisions following the Act. Part IV advocates
emphasizing the copy in copyright by concluding that noncopying
alterations are not infringing derivative works because the Act’s “based
upon” requirement implies evidence of copying. In addition, Part IV
explains that holding noncopying alterations not to infringe the
derivative right would provide a consistent framework for disavowing
two circumspect federal appellate court decisions, and would
substantially eliminate the need for resorting to narrow legislative
exemptions for noncopying alterations. Part V summarizes these
conclusions.
Before continuing, it will be helpful to define the nouns “work,”
“copy,” and “embodiment,” as well as the verbs “reproduce,” “copy,”
and “alter,” as these terms are used in this Comment. Understanding the
distinctions between these terms will help clearly define the concept of a
“noncopying alteration.” Additionally, subtle distinctions between these
terms will help form the basis for the conclusions this Comment reaches.
A “work,” as used herein, means a copyrightable work, as defined by
the Copyright Act—that is, an “original work[] of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression . . . from which [it] can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device.”6 For example, a printed script of a drama intended
for live performance is a work because it is fixed in the tangible
mediums of ink and paper. An impromptu theatrical performance,
however, is not a work because it is not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. Alternatively, if the same impromptu theatrical performance
were recorded, it would then be a work because the recording is fixed in
a tangible medium of expression.

6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (defining general subject matter of copyright).
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A “copy” of a work, as defined in this Comment,7 is a substantially
similar representation of the original work, or its copyrightable elements,
in a similar form of object as the original—that is, an object consisting of
a medium similar to the medium of the object in which the original work
was fixed. For example, books published from a handwritten manuscript
are copies of the manuscript. Each book is a substantially similar
representation of the original manuscript and is fixed into an object (the
printed pages of the book) that is similar to the original object in which
the work was fixed (the handwritten pages of the manuscript). Thus, the
published books are “copies” of the handwritten manuscript.
As used herein, to “reproduce” a work means to intentionally
multiply copies of a work. It is possible, however, to copy (verb) a work
without reproducing a copy (noun) of it. In other words, although
reproducing a work is one way of copying a work, there are also other
ways.8 For example, a movie based upon a book copies the book, even
though the movie is not a copy of the book. Although the movie is a
substantially similar representation of the book, the film recording (either
digital or analog) is not a similar medium to the printed pages of the
book. Thus, even though the process of deriving one work from another
necessarily requires copying, the resultant derivative work is not properly
called a copy of the work from which it is derived. Similarly, a live
performance of a dramatic script copies the script—when, for instance,
the performers repeat the dialogue from the script—even though the
performance is not a copy of the script. Defining the concept of copying
to include activities other than just reproducing a work—such as
preparing derivative works or performing works—comports with the
common, everyday use of the verb “copy.” For instance, children might
complain that siblings copy their favorite basketball moves or copy their
styles of dress and grooming, even though the allegedly infringing

7. The Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The definition of “copy” provided in this Comment, in essence, embellishes this definition in two
ways. First, it clarifies that a copy is substantially similar to the original work. Second, it clarifies
that the material object, in which the copy is fixed, consists of a medium similar to the medium in
which the original work was fixed. This second element helps distinguish a “copy” of a work from
an “embodiment” of a work.
8. For more on the distinction between reproducing and copying, see, for example, 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[A] (1963).
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siblings would not have reproduced anything by their allegedly copying
behavior.9
Because the common, everyday use of the verb “copy” may include
more activities than just reproduction, it is necessary to distinguish
between the noun and verb forms of the term “copy,” and, in so doing, to
distinguish between “reproducing” a work—that is, intentionally
multiplying copies of a work—and “copying” a work. In this Comment,
the term “copy,” as a verb, means to intentionally multiply embodiments
of a work or its elements. An “embodiment” of a work, as defined here,10
is a substantially similar representation of the original work, or its
copyrightable elements, in any form. In contrast to a copy, an
embodiment of a work need not be fixed in a similar object, or even be
fixed in any object at all. Thus, the elements of a literary work previously
published in a book, for example, may be embodied in an object similar
to the original (for example, a photocopy), embodied in an object
different from the original (for example, a motion picture), or embodied
in no object at all (for example, a live performance).
In summary, this Comment distinguishes the concept of copying a
work from the concept of reproducing a copy of a work. The definition
of the term “copy” depends on whether it is being used as a noun or as a
verb. Although the noun form of “copy” generally refers only to a
reproduction of a work, the verb form of “copy” generally refers to other
activities in addition to reproduction, including the preparation of
derivative works and the performance of works. Now that the “copying”
element of “noncopying alteration” has been described, it will be helpful
to define the “alteration” element.
The term “alter” is easy to define, but difficult to apply. Succinctly,
the term “alter” merely means to modify. Copyrighted works may be
altered in a number of ways. For example, movies based upon books, in
most cases, alter certain elements of the respective books in order to
adapt them to cinematic storytelling. In this example, the movie producer
copies and alters the original copyrighted text. It is possible, however, to
alter a copyrighted work without copying it. For example, a book retailer
might decide to excise vulgar words from copies of particular novels by
marking through the words with a thick, black marker. In this example,

9. In this sense, it may be helpful to think of copying as “mimicking.”
10. The term “embodiment” is not common to copyright law. There is no intention here to
draw any parallels to the use of the term in patent law.
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the book retailer has altered copies of original works without copying the
respective works. Accordingly, this Comment refers to these kinds of
alterations as noncopying alterations. Whether copyright law should
prohibit unauthorized, noncopying alterations is an important policy
discussion that this Comment does not directly address. Instead, this
Comment focuses on whether the 1976 Copyright Act did prohibit
unauthorized, noncopying alterations.
With these definitions in mind, it is possible to make a subtle, but
important, point: altering a copy of an original work may create a new
work without copying the original work. This point is best understood by
way of example. Consider an artist who paints a landscape picture of a
treeless prairie and sells the picture to another artist. If the second artist
paints a tree in the middle of the prairie, the original work of art was
modified (or altered), but it was not multiplied. Although the alteration
created a new work—assuming the tree contained sufficiently original
expression—it was not another embodiment of the original work and,
therefore, did not multiply embodiments of the original work. Thus, mere
alterations to a copy of a work—even those that create separate,
additional works—do not necessarily multiply the original work; instead
these noncopying alterations embody other, additional works.
It is possible, however, to alter a work in such a way that the
alteration copies—that is, intentionally multiplies the embodiments of—
the original work. For example, consider an artist who paints a landscape
picture of a prairie with a single tree and sells the picture to another
artist. If the second artist paints onto the original picture a second tree
that is substantially similar to the first tree, then the original work—or,
more specifically, an element of it (the tree)—has been multiplied. There
are now two embodiments of an original work: the first tree embodied in
the paint of the original painting and the second tree embodied in the
paint of the alteration. In this example, a copying alteration multiplied
the number of embodiments of an original work. Thus, although an
alteration to a copy does not necessarily copy the original work, it may.
The analysis in Parts III and IV depends on this distinction between
copying and noncopying alterations.
Finally, it will be helpful to make another subtle, but important,
point: a work may be created from another work without creating a
multiple embodiment of the original work. Consider again the first
example of an artist who paints a landscape picture of a treeless prairie
and sells the picture to another artist. As mentioned above, if the second
artist paints a tree in the middle of the prairie, a multiple embodiment of
1266
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the original work is not created because the added expression, the tree, is
completely original. This is true even though the resulting work
comprises the original work. As another example, consider an
automobile, which is comprised of its parts, but does not embody its
parts. An automobile embodies a design, which may have originated on a
drafting board or a computer screen. Thus, an automobile is comprised of
its parts, but it embodies a design. Assembling an automobile does not
create a multiple embodiment of its parts, though it does create an
embodiment of the automobile design.
At times it is difficult to identify a noncopying alteration because the
altered work is comprised of copies of an original work. The key to
distinguishing a noncopying alteration from a copying alteration is to ask
whether the alteration copied—that is, to ask whether an original work
was copied in the process of alteration. Thus, the addition of a tree to a
painting of a treeless prairie does not necessarily copy, unless the added
tree is copied from another work. Even though the resulting work—a
painting of a prairie with a single tree—comprises a copy of the original
work, the alteration did not copy any expression from the original work,
making the alteration a noncopying alteration. Similarly, an assembled
automobile does not copy its parts, though it does copy its design,
making the assembly a noncopying alteration. While reading about the
noncopying alterations discussed in Parts III and IV, it will be helpful to
keep this distinction in mind.
II. BACKGROUND: THE GRADUAL EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT
Originally, copyright protected authors only from the unauthorized
reproduction of their original works. Over the years, the derivative right
gradually grew out of this original reproduction right.11 In 1790, the first
copyright statute conferred to the authors of “any map, chart, book or
books” only the rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing and

11. For more on the history of the gradual development of the derivative right, see Paul
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
209, 211–15 (1983). In addition, although not specifically addressing derivative rights, Professor L.
Ray Patterson’s insightful history of copyright provides helpful background for drawing the
distinction between derivative works that copy preexisting works and derivative works that merely
alter copies of preexisting works. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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vending.”12 Owing to this narrow reach of copyright, Harriet Beecher
Stowe was unable to exclude unauthorized translations of her novel
Uncle Tom’s Cabin into German.13 Although the translation was, in
essence, “the same book,”14 the deciding court held that the copyright
statute extended only to the “particular combination of characters” in the
author’s original book.15 Significantly, the court observed that copying
had occurred, but it refused to recognize such copying as prohibited by
statute: “A translation may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or
copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be
called a copy of her book.”16 Thus, copyright did not originally prohibit
all forms of copying; rather, copyright prohibited only reproduction.
Slowly, Congress began to expand the scope of copyright to include
many forms of copying other than just page-by-page duplication. In
1856, Congress prohibited theater performers from copying (that is,
performing without permission) an author’s protected, dramatic works.17
Then, in the Copyright Acts of 1870 and 1909, Congress prohibited
several forms of derivative copying. Taken together, the 1870 and 1909
Copyright Acts expressly prohibited, without the author’s permission, the

12. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). Although, the 1831 Act
expanded the list of protected works to include musical compositions, the exclusive rights of authors
remained only those of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,
§ 1, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
13. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
14. Id. at 202.
15. Id. at 206. The court reasoned,
The claim of literary property, therefore, after publication, cannot be in the ideas,
sentiments, or the creations of the imagination of the poet or novelist as dissevered from
the language, idiom, style, or the outward semblance and exhibition of them. His
exclusive property in the creation of his mind, cannot be vested in the author as
abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in
which he has clothed them. When he has sold his book, the only property which he
reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the
copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another
the ideas intended to be conveyed. This is what the law terms copy, or copyright.
Id. at 206–07 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
17. Specifically, Congress included dramatic compositions among the list of protected works
and granted the author of such a work the “sole right to act, perform, or represent the same, or cause
it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public place.” Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch.
169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870). This was the first manifestation of the present-day performance
right codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
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translation of literary works into other languages,18 the conversion of
dramatic compositions into novels19 (and vice versa20), the arrangement
or adaptation of musical works for use with different voices or
instruments,21 and the creation of three-dimensional works of art from
two-dimensional models or designs.22 Thus, copyright gradually began to
prohibit the copying of themes, styles, characters, forms, structures,
stories, plots, designs, arrangements, organizations, etc., in addition to
prohibiting exact print duplication. For instance, the Supreme Court in
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.23 held that an unauthorized motion picture
infringed the dramatization right of the copyright owner of the novel Ben
Hur because the silent film acted out certain “portions [of the book]
giving enough of the story [so as] to be identified with ease.”24
Although the 1870 and 1909 Acts expanded the scope of copy
protection, courts did not interpret copyright to prohibit all methods of
copying. For instance, the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.25 held that perforated rolls used to operate
18. The exclusive right to translate a work originated in the 1870 Copyright Act. Act of July
8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909) (granting authors the exclusive “right to . . .
translate their . . . works”). The 1909 Copyright Act preserved this right. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976) (preserving the author’s exclusive right to translate
literary works “into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof”).
19. The exclusive right to dramatize a work originated in the 1870 Copyright Act. Act of July
8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909) (granting authors the exclusive “right to
dramatize . . . their . . . works”). The 1909 Copyright Act preserved this right. Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976) (preserving the author’s exclusive right “to dramatize
[a copyrighted work] if it be a non-dramatic work”).
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976) (granting authors the
exclusive right “to convert [the copyrighted work] into a novel or other non-dramatic work if it be a
drama”).
21. Id. (granting authors the exclusive right “to arrange or adapt [the copyrighted work] if it
be a musical work”).
22. Id. (granting authors the exclusive right “to complete, execute, and finish [the
copyrighted work] if it be a model or design for a work of art”).
23. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
24. Id. at 60. The Court stated,
We are of the opinion that Ben Hur was dramatized by what was done. Whether we
consider the purpose of this clause of the statute [the 1891 Act], or the etymological
history and present usages of language, drama may be achieved by action as well as by
speech. Action can tell a story, display all the most vivid relations between men, and
depict every kind of human emotion, without aid of a word.
Id. at 61. Although the case was decided in 1911, the Court applied the provisions of the 1891 Act
(which had amended the 1870 Act), presumably, because the motion picture was released in 1907,
which was prior to the enactment of the 1909 Act. See id.
25. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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player pianos were not “copies or publications of the [original]
copyrighted music.”26 Additionally, in Kalem Justice Holmes
acknowledged—without deciding, however, the merits of—the lower
court’s conclusion that “pictures of scenes in a novel may be made and
exhibited without infringing the copyright.”27 Thus, the Supreme Court
had refused to recognize that player-piano music rolls or pictorial
representations of novels were the result of prohibited copying, even
though both had been based upon original works.
When Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, however, it granted
copyright owners, in very broad terms, the exclusive right, inter alia,28
“to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”29
Significantly, the definition of “derivative work” encompassed not only
familiar examples such as translations and dramatizations, which had
been protected previously, but also included “any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”30 Because the derivative
right was defined so broadly, plaintiff copyright owners began to allege
infringement for mere alterations to copies of their works—as, arguably,
any alteration to a copyrighted work might recast, transform, or adapt
that work—even though the defendants had never copied the plaintiffs’
works.31 In some cases, plaintiffs sought to enforce otherwise
unenforceable “moral rights”32 disguised as infringement claims.33 This

26. Id. at 18. Concurring specially, Justice Holmes appeared to concede to the majority’s
holding only out of respect for the “opinions in this country and abroad.” Id. (Holmes, J.,
concurring). He subsequently opined, “On principle anything that mechanically reproduces [the]
collocation of sounds [of the original musical composition] ought to be held a copy . . . .” Id. at 20
(Holmes, J., concurring).
27. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62.
28. The 1976 Copyright Act also grants owners the right to reproduce, distribute, perform,
and display their copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3)–(6) (2000).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (emphasis added).
30. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. The term “moral rights” originates from the French le droit moral, the doctrine that an
author possesses, in addition to economic interests, certain personal rights in their original works of
art, such as rights of integrity and attribution. For more on moral rights, see, for example, 3 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 8, § 8D. Commentators and courts disagree on the extent to which American
copyright law recognizes moral rights. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 8D.02[A], at
8D-10 to -11.
33. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. Because it appears that other plaintiffs have
alleged infringement of the derivative right for economic reasons, it is only accurate to write that
some plaintiffs have attempted to enforce otherwise unenforceable moral rights through the
backdoor of alleging infringement of the derivative right.
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Comment concludes that Congress did not intend this result. As
demonstrated in Part IV.A, neither the context nor the text of the Act
supports finding copyright infringement without evidence of copying.
Before addressing the proper interpretation of the modern-day derivative
right, however, it will be helpful to examine how courts have treated
noncopying alterations both before and after the Act.
III. CASE LAW ADDRESSING NONCOPYING ALTERATIONS:
BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
This Part attempts to collect federal case law addressing noncopying
alterations. Because courts and commentators have not directly
addressed whether noncopying alterations prepare infringing derivative
works, this collection is unique. Although other authors have identified
groups of cases within this field,34 these cases have not been identified
for their noncopying characteristic. In other words, the following cases
have never been characterized as a distinct category of derivative works
cases—that is, as noncopying-alteration cases.
Because the 1976 Copyright Act changed how courts decided
controversies arising from noncopying alterations, this Part first collects
all pre-1976 cases addressing noncopying alterations—when courts
generally did not find infringement absent proof of copying—and then
collects all post-1976 cases—when courts began to divide over whether
certain noncopying alterations infringed the derivative right. Again,
neither courts nor commentators have categorized these cases according
to their noncopying characteristic, so it should be remembered that courts
have not expressly, or perhaps even consciously, divided over whether
noncopying alterations prepare infringing derivative works. As of yet, no
court has squarely addressed the issue. In a sense, courts have divided
unwittingly, some holding certain noncopying alterations to be infringing
and some finding other noncopying alterations not to be infringing. All

34. See, e.g., Edward G. Black & Michael H. Page, Add-on Infringements: When Computer
Add-ons and Peripherals Should (and Should Not) Be Considered Infringing Derivative Works
Under Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., and Other Recent Decisions, 15
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 615 (1993) (addressing computer add-ons); Lydia Pallas Loren, The
Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 57 (2000) (addressing “integrated works,” those works that reference but do not copy other
works); Pamela Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright To Accommodate
a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179 (1988) (addressing modifications to software).
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of these cases ignore the question of whether noncopying alterations
prepare infringing derivative works.
A. Before the 1976 Copyright Act: No Infringement
Absent Proof of Copying
Prior to the 1976 Act, courts generally found no copyright
infringement without proof of copying, even when defendants altered
original works without authorization. By far the most often litigated
controversy was the rebinding of books.
In the rebound-book cases, courts consistently held that the mere
restoration of copyrighted books did not infringe copyright. For example,
in Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co.,35 a secondhand book dealer did
not infringe the copyright of the plaintiff when the defendant rebound,
for the purpose of resale, damaged copies of the plaintiff’s books.36 In a
similar case, Doan v. American Book Co.,37 the plaintiff argued that
copyright prohibited unauthorized repair or renewal of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work by those who purchased copies of it. Relying on
Harrison, the court of appeals concluded, “A right of ownership in the
book carries with it and includes the right to maintain the book as nearly
as possible in its original condition, so far, at least, as the cover and the
binding of the book is concerned.”38 Thus, courts consistently rejected
35. 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894).
36. The court reasoned: “The new purchaser cannot reprint the copy. He cannot print or
publish a new edition of the book; but, the copy having been absolutely sold to him, the ordinary
incidents of ownership in personal property, among which is the right of alienation, attach to it.” Id.
at 691. (Interestingly, although the defendant had altered copies of the plaintiff’s work without
permission, the plaintiff did not object to the unauthorized alteration of the books per se, but rather
to their unauthorized resale.) Although the plaintiff had sold the copies (to merchants who later sold
them to the defendant) with the express condition that the books be used for paper stock and not
otherwise be placed on the market, the court held that the plaintiff could not enforce, by virtue of
copyright, the contractual agreements between the plaintiff and an original purchaser against a
subsequent purchaser. Id. According to the court, the plaintiff’s sole remedy was for breach of
contract against the original purchaser. Id.
Harrison’s holding has been followed by subsequent courts. See, e.g., Indep. News Co. v.
Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961) (refusing to hold defendant liable for copyright infringement
for purchasing cover-removed comics from waste paper dealers); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v.
Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (finding no copyright infringement when the
defendant sold separately plaintiff’s copyrighted phonorecords and bottles of shampoo, which were
originally sold to a third party who agreed to a restrictive license with the plaintiff to sell the records
and shampoo together).
37. 105 F. 772 (7th Cir. 1901).
38. Id. at 777 (citing Harrison, 61 F. 689).
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claims of copyright infringement for unauthorized, noncopying
alterations of books, at least for restorative purposes.39
Courts were less consistent deciding cases addressing book
alterations for nonrestorative purposes. One appellate court, in Kipling v.
G.P. Putnam’s Sons,40 affirmed Harrison and Doan and held that
binding previously unbound manuscripts did not infringe the copyright in
the manuscripts.41 Two district courts, however, split over whether
unauthorized, noncopying compilations infringed. National Geographic
Society v. Classified Geographic42 held that the defendant infringed the
plaintiff’s copyrights when the defendant purchased secondhand copies
of the plaintiff’s magazine, disassembled the magazines into separate
articles, and organized and bound like-category articles into book form.43
In contrast, Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co.44 held that the
defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s copyright when the defendant
purchased secondhand copies of the plaintiff’s comic book and
subsequently bound them together with other comic publications (not
owned by the plaintiff).45 These cases are, perhaps, distinguishable
because the defendant in National Geographic recompiled only the
39. But see Ginn & Co. v. Appollo Publ’g Co., 215 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914) (holding
defendant book restorer liable for copyright infringement for appending recopied maps and reprinted
text to replace the missing parts in the used books). In Ginn & Co., however, there was evidence of
copying, even though it was only for restorative purposes. Id. at 775. It is unclear whether the court
would have found the appendage of non-copied maps and text to be infringing.
Doan v. American Book Co., 105 F. 772 (7th Cir. 1901), however, also involved copying.
Interestingly, the court permitted the “exact imitation”—that is, the copying—of the original binding
design in order to restore the book to its original condition. See id. at 774. Arguably, the copying
required for restoration does not multiply the copies of the original work, but rather maintains copies
of the original work. Doan may have relied on this assumption; otherwise, it is difficult to
understand why the court permitted the defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s (presumably
copyrightable) bindings, though it may be the case that the plaintiff never copyrighted the bindings
or that the bindings were not sufficiently original to be copyrightable, leaving them unprotected.
Ginn & Co., though referencing Doan, did not justify the distinction between copying the binding
(permitted in Doan) and copying the text, which it prohibited. See Ginn & Co., 215 F.2d at 778. The
issue of restorative copying highlights the subtle problem of nonmultiplicative copying.
40. 120 F. 631 (2d Cir. 1903).
41. Id. at 634. Kipling also permitted a purchaser to compile an index reference for the
copyrighted works, even though this required the copying of words and phrases. Id. at 635. This
permissible copying is best understood as a fair use of the copyrighted work, or perhaps more
precisely, a fair copy.
42. 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939).
43. Id. at 657.
44. 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
45. Id. at 717–18.
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plaintiff’s works, albeit in a different order, whereas the defendant in
Fawcett Publications recompiled the plaintiff’s work with other works
the plaintiff did not own. This distinction, however, is without
significance. In both cases, the defendant altered (when the defendant
compiled) lawfully purchased copies of the plaintiff’s works without
copying them, yet the deciding courts reached opposite conclusions. On
this basis, these cases are irreconcilable.
In addition to the bookbinding cases, pre-1976 courts also addressed
other controversies arising from unauthorized, noncopying alterations.
As in the bookbinding cases, these courts generally did not find
copyright infringement absent copying—that is, absent some
multiplication of embodiments of the work. In Scarves by Vera, Inc. v.
American Handbags, Inc.,46 the defendant made women’s handbags
from copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted towels, but the plaintiff did not
challenge this unauthorized alteration, presumably because there was
little, if any, precedent for noncopying infringement.47 In another case,
Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp.,48 the defendant repainted a copy
(lawfully purchased) of the plaintiff’s copyrighted hobbyhorse for
display in defendant’s showroom. Here the plaintiff alleged
infringement, but the district court ruled for the defendant, observing, “It
is clear that before there can be infringement there must be . . . some
proof of copying, and as a matter of logic there can be no copying in the
case at bar where the horse seized and alleged to copy [the plaintiff’s
horse] . . . is in fact [the same horse] . . . .”49 Finally, in C.M. Paula Co.
v. Logan,50 the defendant used a “transfer medium” to remove
copyrighted designs from greeting cards and notepads and affixed the
removed images to ceramic plaques.51 The federal district court

46. 188 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
47. Id. at 258. Instead, the plaintiff objected to the defendant’s removal of the copyright
notice from the towels, alleging that consumers would be confused as to the source of the
copyrighted design. Id. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the defendant from selling the
handbags without notice that the design was the copyrighted design of the plaintiff. Id. The parties
did not raise, and the court did not consider, whether an unauthorized alteration violates copyright
because, presumably, prior to the 1976 Act infringement required proof of copying, and there was no
evidence of copying in this case.
48. 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
49. Id. at 420 (emphasis omitted) (citing Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Gruber 86 F.2d 958 (1st
Cir. 1936)).
50. 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
51. Id. at 190.
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concluded,
“the
process
. . . does not constitute copying.”52
It will be helpful to examine the reasoning from C.M. Paula more
closely, as the opinion explains very carefully why the process of
altering a work is not the same as copying a work. The district court
reasoned:
The Court notes at the outset that without copying there can be no
infringement of copyright. . . . The process utilized by defendant that is
now in question results in the use of the original image on a ceramic
plaque; such process is not a “reproduction or duplication.”
. . . Each ceramic plaque sold by defendant with a Paula print
affixed thereto requires the purchase and use of an individual piece of
artwork marketed by the plaintiff. For example, should defendant desire
to make one hundred ceramic plaques using the identical Paula print,
defendant would be required to purchase one hundred separate Paula
prints. The Court finds that the process here in question does not
constitute copying.53

If, in the alternative, the defendant had created one-hundred ceramic
plaques by purchasing a single copy of the copyrighted work,
reproducing that copy ninety-nine times, and affixing the total onehundred copies onto ceramic plaques, then the defendant would have
been liable for infringement—for multiplying ninety-nine additional
copies of the work. Because the multiplying element was absent, the
district court concluded that no copying had occurred.
In contrast, in the many pre-1976 cases where unauthorized
alterations did involve copying, courts consistently found copyright
infringement. One example is Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v.
Brown,54 in which the defendants published solutions to the plaintiffs’
physics textbook without permission, altering how students used the
textbook.55 Although the defendants’ solutions, in general, “substitut[ed]

52. Id. at 191 (citing Blazon, 268 F. Supp. at 434).
53. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Blazon, 268 F. Supp. at 434).
54. 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
55. Characterizing Addison-Wesley as an alteration case requires some consideration. If
students have access to the solutions in the textbook, the students will use the textbook in a different
manner, utilizing the published solutions to help them answer the textbook problems. This altered
use constitutes the unauthorized alteration, though it is not a permanent alteration and occurs only
during the real-time use or operation of the work.
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paraphrase for direct quotation” of the original problems,56 the court
appeared to rest its holding of infringement on the finding that the
defendant had nevertheless copied from the plaintiff, even though the
copy was not a literal reproduction.57 The court did not address whether
publishing the solutions, without copying any of the original problems,
would infringe.
Gilliam v. ABC, Inc.58 is another case involving unauthorized
alterations with evidence of copying. In Gilliam, the BBC licensed to
ABC certain recorded performances of the British group of writers and
performers known as “Monty Python,” and ABC subsequently broadcast
unauthorized, edited versions of these recordings to which Monty Python
objected.59 Because the BBC agreement with Monty Python had reserved
to the group the right to make any significant editorial changes, Gilliam
held that ABC had exceeded the scope of the license that the BBC had
the authority to give, thereby infringing the copyright by releasing an
unauthorized copy.60 Thus, this holding is consistent with the general
trend of the courts during the pre–1976 Act era to find copyright
infringement only when a defendant had copied the plaintiff’s works. In
Gilliam, the infringement occurred as a result of having exceeded the
scope of the license—that is, as a result of having impermissibly copied
the work by broadcasting an unauthorized copy. It was not the alteration
per se—but rather the broadcast of the alteration—that infringed the
copyright.
Thus, prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, several controversies over
noncopying alterations reached the courts. Those courts consistently

56. Id. at 223. The court did note, however, that “[o]ccasionally . . . momentary forgetfulness
of their plan of camouflage or difficulty in accommodating it to their objective led them to
incorporate in their manual a literal or indefensibly close approximation of what might be found in
plaintiffs’ texts.” Id.
57. The court cited to several authorities for the proposition that copying need not be
restricted to literal repetition, indicating, perhaps, that the court found the evidence of copying to be
dispositive. See id. at 227. Rather than rest its decision expressly on copying, however, the court
instead concluded, “It is clear that defendants’ parasitical excrescence upon plaintiffs’ distinguished
and useful works profits defendants alone. In this symbiosis defendants thrive, while their manual
kills the host it feeds upon. The Court sees nothing here warranting the exercise by it of an exigent
astuteness to ferret out some legal justification for defendants’ overuse of plaintiffs’ copyrighted
material.” Id. at 228.
58. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 17–18.
60. Id. at 19–23.
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rejected copyright infringement claims for unauthorized alterations
absent some proof of copying.61
B. After the 1976 Copyright Act: Courts Inconsistently Decide Whether
Noncopying Alterations Prepare Infringing Derivative Works
Since enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, courts have
inconsistently decided cases addressing noncopying alterations. Much of
this confusion originates from the broadly defined derivative right, first
enacted in the 1976 Act. As discussed previously in Part II, although
copyright owners previously enjoyed the exclusive right to prepare
certain kinds of derivative works, such as translations and
dramatizations,62 the 1976 Act recognized for the first time a broad,
umbrella derivative right, granting copyright owners the exclusive right
“to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”63
What precisely is a “derivative work”? The Act defines a “derivative
work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works” and
includes a nonexhaustive list of examples.64 In addition to listing familiar
examples, such as translations and dramatizations, the Act also includes a
broad, catchall phrase: “or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.”65 Thus, a derivative work appears to be
any work that recasts, transforms, or adapts a preexisting work.
Courts and commentators have characterized this definition as
“hopelessly overbroad”66 and “expansive.”67 On the one hand, the broad
definition may be representative of the steadily increasing scope of
copyright, described as follows by one prominent commentator:
“Copyright, which once protected only against the production of
substantially similar copies in the same medium as the copyrighted work,
today protects against uses and media that often lie far afield from the

61. The lone exception, National Geographic Society v. Classified Geographic, was in direct
contrast with the contemporaneous case of Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co. See supra
notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. Previous acts did not refer to these works
as “derivative works”; rather, it is a modern term, adopted in the 1976 Act.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
64. For the full text of the definition, see text accompanying infra note 225.
65. Id.
66. E.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998).
67. E.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3, at 5:81 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (describing the
Act’s definition of derivative works as being “in the most expansive terms”).
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original.”68 As shown below, however, courts and commentators have
struggled to define the outer boundaries of the broadly defined derivative
right. One unresolved question is whether mere alterations to copyrighted
works infringe the derivative right, even absent any evidence of copying
by the defendants. Arguably, an alteration may recast, transform, or
adapt a preexisting work without copying that work. As discussed
previously in Part III.A, however, prior to the 1976 Act courts generally
did not find that copyright prohibited noncopying alterations. Since the
1976 Act, courts have inconsistently decided cases addressing
noncopying alterations. In general, courts have not directly addressed
whether the definition of derivative works includes noncopying
alterations, which undoubtedly has contributed to the confusion.
After the 1976 Act, noncopying alterations have generally surfaced
in one of two distinct, though related, scenarios. In the first scenario,
defendants purchase copies of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted work,
physically alter or modify the copies (without copying), and
subsequently resell the very same copies they purchased. This Comment
refers to these alterations as static (one-time) alterations because the
alterations generally occur at one fixed point in time. For instance, a
clothing company might alter copyrighted fabric by sewing it into
garments.69 In the second scenario, defendants sell add-on products that
function in a complementary manner with the plaintiffs’ works to alter or
modify (without copying) the respective work’s real-time playback or
display. This Comment refers to these alterations as dynamic (real-time)
alterations because the alterations are made on the fly, reoccurring during
each playback or display of the copyrighted work. For instance, a videoediting company might alter copyrighted movies by selling filters that
omit certain scenes and mute certain dialogue only during real-time
playback of the home video.70
As shown below, numerous plaintiffs have objected to any
unauthorized alterations of their copyrighted works, whether in the form
68. Goldstein, supra note 11, at 209.
69. All static alterations to a given work, however, do not necessarily occur at the same time.
Thus, a secondhand clothing dealer might further alter the same garments.
70. In a sense, a video filter is an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work, rather than an
unauthorized alteration. Although it may be meaningful to describe “alterations” as unauthorized
uses, this Comment employs the term “alter” to also include uses that result in alterations. This is
primarily to avoid the misunderstood description of the doctrine of fair use, which is understood best
as fair copying because the doctrine has no origin in noncopying uses. See, e.g., Patterson, supra
note 11, at 13–53.
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of static or dynamic modification, regardless of whether the defendants
actually copied their works. Significantly, the pace of litigation appears
to be increasing, making the resolution of this issue timely and
important. In the first ten years following enactment of the 1976 Act,
there was only one case, Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International, Inc.,71 in which a plaintiff alleged that a noncopying
alteration infringed the derivative right. As demonstrated below, the
number of cases addressing noncopying alterations has increased almost
exponentially in the succeeding decades.
1. Static (one-time) alterations
As discussed previously in Part III.A, controversies over noncopying
alterations prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act included the following
static alterations: rebinding copyrighted print (for both restorative and
nonrestorative purposes), manufacturing handbags from copyrighted
fabrics, repainting hobbyhorses, and affixing designs removed from
greeting cards and notepads to ceramic plaques. In each controversy, the
defendants purchased copies of the respective plaintiff’s works, altered
the purchased copies, and then resold, or otherwise reused commercially,
the altered copies. Following the 1976 Act, additional controversies
arose over affixing copyrighted artworks to ceramic tiles, manufacturing
baby bedding from copyrighted fabrics, and editing home video
cassettes. Similar to their pre-1976 counterparts, the defendants in these
more recent controversies purchased copies of the respective plaintiff’s
works, altered the purchased copies, and then resold the altered copies. In
contrast to their pre-1976 counterparts, however, courts decided
inconsistently whether these noncopying alterations infringed the
respective plaintiff’s copyrights.
In the post-1976 era, the most litigated example of static alteration
arose from affixing prints of copyrighted artworks to ceramic tiles. A
circuit split developed in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over whether
the creation of these ceramic tiles amounted to the preparation of
infringing derivative works. In Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co.,72 the defendant, without permission, purchased compilations
of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works, removed selected pages from the
71. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant manufactured replacement circuit boards to
speed up plaintiff’s arcade video game).
72. 856 F.2d 1341 (1988). For more regarding the issue of decompilation, see infra note 77.
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books, mounted the removed pages onto ceramic tiles, and then offered
the tiles for sale.73 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant art
company made “another version” of the plaintiff’s works, and held that
this other version was an infringing derivative work.74 To arrive at its
conclusion, the court explained, “The protection of derivative rights
extends beyond mere protection against unauthorized copying to include
the right to make other versions of, perform, or exhibit the work.”75
From the context, it appears that the Ninth Circuit equated copying with
reproduction, but the court never explained why making another version
of, performing, or exhibiting a work are not forms of “unauthorized
copying.” Two district courts in the Ninth Circuit have since followed
the holding of Mirage; one district court found (and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed) that affixing individual note cards to ceramic tiles created
derivative works,76 and another found that disassembling a copyrighted
73. Id. at 1342. The court explained the process in detail:
Since 1984, the primary business of appellant has consisted of: 1) purchasing artwork
prints or books including good quality artwork page prints therein; 2) gluing each
individual print or page print onto a rectangular sheet of black plastic material exposing a
narrow black margin around the print; 3) gluing the black sheet with print onto a major
surface of a rectangular white ceramic tile; 4) applying a transparent plastic film over the
print, black sheet and ceramic tile surface; and 5) offering the tile with artwork mounted
thereon for sale in the retail market.
Id.
74. Id. at 1343.
75. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d
718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979)).
76. Muñoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d
1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion). As in Mirage, the defendant art company in Muñoz
(which was the same defendant in Mirage) had affixed plaintiff’s copyrighted works onto ceramic
tile. See id. at 310–11. Unlike Mirage, however, the defendant did not disassemble plaintiff’s
artwork; instead of mounting the separate pages from books, the defendant mounted individual
copyrighted notecards. Id. Thus, Muñoz isolated for examination the process of mounting
copyrighted artwork onto ceramic tile. For more regarding the issue of decompilation, see infra note
77.
In defense of its tile art business, the defendant argued that mounting notecards onto ceramic
tiles is indistinguishable from framing a print or painting—both practices “amount[] to nothing more
than a display of the artwork.” Muñoz, 829 F. Supp. at 314. The district court did not agree.
Observing that the defendant “permanently affix[ed]” the notecards, the court concluded that the
original artwork was indeed recast, transformed, or adapted. Id. The court distinguished framing
because “[i]t is commonly understood that this [framing] amounts to only a method of display,” and
that “it is a relatively simple matter to remove the print or painting and display it differently if the
owner chooses to do so.” Id. In making one final distinction, the court noted that “tiles lend
themselves to other uses such as trivets (individually) or wall coverings (collectively).” Id. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in an unpublished opinion. Muñoz, 38 F.3d
1218.
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work and separately framing the individual pages likewise created
derivative works.77
A split in the circuits developed when A.R.T. Co. (formerly
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. in Mirage) successfully defended the same
practice of mounting note cards onto ceramic tiles that the Ninth Circuit
previously rejected. In Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,78 the Seventh Circuit expressly
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between tile-art mounting and
traditional methods of framing.79 Instead, it found that the copyrighted
note cards were not transformed80 by the tile art process because each
77. Greenwich Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal.
1996). As in Mirage, the defendant art company (a different defendant from that in Mirage)
disassembled plaintiff’s books and resold the separate pages. See id. at 1211. Unlike Mirage,
however, the defendant did not mount plaintiff’s artwork onto ceramic tile; instead, the defendant
matted and framed the individual bookplates. Thus, Greenwich isolated for examination the process
of disassembling and reselling individual pages of a copyrighted work.
In defense of its business model, the defendant in Greenwich relied on the Muñoz opinion,
which endorsed the practice of framing as a simple method of display that did not amount to
preparing a derivative work. Id. at 1213. Although ruling that the defendant infringed “the plaintiff’s
copyrights in both the artwork and the book,” the court appears to have based its finding exclusively
on the defendant’s removal of pages from the plaintiff’s books. Id. at 1214–15. For a thoughtful
discussion of the decompilation of collected works at issue in Mirage and Greenwich, which this
Comment does not address, see Steve Lauff, Note, Decompilation of Collective Works: When the
First Sale Doctrine Is a Mirage, 76 TEX. L. REV. 869, 889 (1998).
78. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). Lee endorses the exact mounting process that the Ninth
Circuit found infringing in Muñoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished opinion), aff’g, 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993). For more on Muñoz, see supra note
76. Lee directly addresses the process of mounting copyrighted works onto ceramic tile, avoiding the
decompilation issue present in Mirage.
79. Lee, 125 F.3d at 581 (agreeing with the district court that this is “a distinction without a
difference”).
If changing the way in which a work of art will be displayed creates a derivative work . . .
then the derivative work is “prepared” when the art is mounted; what happens later [that
is, permanent affixation] is not relevant, because the violation of the § 106(2) right has
already occurred. If the framing process does not create a derivative work, then mounting
art on a tile, which serves as a flush frame, does not create a derivative work. What is
more, the ninth circuit erred in assuming that normal means of mounting and displaying
are easily reversible. A painting is placed in a wooden “stretcher” as part of the framing
process; this leads to some punctures (commonly tacks or staples), may entail trimming
the edges of the canvas, and may affect the surface of the painting as well. . . . As a
prelude to framing, photographs, prints, and posters may be mounted on stiff boards
using wax sheets, but sometimes glue or another more durable substance is employed to
create the bond.
Id.
80. Id. at 582. The Seventh Circuit concluded that tile art did not fit any of the enumerated
categories of derivative works defined in § 101, and proceeded to examine whether the mounting
process recast, transformed, or adapted the copyrighted notecards. Concluding, without elaboration,
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piece of artwork “depict[ed] exactly what it depicted when it left [the]
studio.”81 The court opined that if the plaintiff’s interpretation of the
derivative right were followed, then “any alteration of a work, however
slight, [would] require[] the author’s permission.”82
In addition to the tile-art cases, courts have also addressed static
alterations to copyrighted fabrics and videocassette tapes. Addressing
alterations to copyrighted fabrics, a district court, in Precious Moments,
Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc.,83 held that baby bedding manufactured with the
plaintiff’s copyrighted fabrics were not derivative works. In a similar
fashion to the Seventh Circuit in Lee, the court opined that Mirage and
its progeny erroneously “open the door for the most trivial of
modifications to generate an infringing derivative work.”84 In Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcast Systems, Inc.,85 a district court found
that the defendant’s appendage of commercial advertisements to the
plaintiff’s videocassettes did not create derivative works of its
copyrighted motion pictures. Finding Mirage inapplicable (without
disagreeing with the merits), the district court concluded simply, “The
court does not recognize the addition of [defendants’ advertisement] to a
videocassette in any way recasting, transforming or adapting the motion
picture.”86 Perhaps in reference to the holding in Mirage, the court
added, “The result is not a new version of the motion picture.”87

that mounting artwork onto tile does not recast or adapt the notecards, the court acknowledged that
the process might come closer to transforming the works, but ultimately concluded the question in
the negative: “The art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed in the process. It still
depicts exactly what it depicted when it left [the] studio.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 971 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1997).
84. Id. at 69. Although the Seventh Circuit had not yet decided Lee, the district court in
Precious Moments contrasted the district court opinion in Lee, see supra notes 78–82, with the
decisions in both Mirage, see supra note 72, and Muñoz, see supra note 76, and agreed with the
district court opinion in Lee. Id. at 68–69.
85. 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
86. Id. at 821. The court also found inapplicable Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). In prior reference to Mirage and Artic, the court
noted, “In both cases, the derivative work transformed, adapted or recast the original work into a
new and different one.” Paramount, 724 F. Supp. at 821. For more on Artic, see infra notes 90–95.
87. Paramount, 724 F. Supp. at 821.
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2. Dynamic (real-time) alterations
During the pre-1976 era, most controversies over noncopying
alterations arose from static (one-time) alterations to copies of protected
works. Dynamic (real-time) alterations arose during the post-1976 era.88
Most of these controversies surfaced in digital media, such as video
games, website advertising, and digital home videos. In each of these
controversies, defendants, without the permission of the plaintiff, made
products that added onto, plugged into, or otherwise complemented the
respective plaintiff’s copyrighted works. These products altered the realtime appearance of the plaintiff’s work for a temporary period. Similar to
their counterparts deciding static alterations, courts deciding
controversies addressing dynamic alterations have inconsistently decided
whether these noncopying alterations infringe the respective plaintiff’s
copyrights. Again, courts have disagreed over the relative breadth of the
derivative right. Because some of the cases presented below refer to the
cases decided before them, they are presented chronologically.
Among the dynamic-alteration cases, video-game components have
provided the most prevalent source for litigation. A video-arcade
enhancement kit was the first instance of a noncopying alteration to be
found an infringing derivative work under the 1976 Act. After several
courts had decided instances of video-arcade-game copying,89 Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.90 addressed enhancement
kits that merely altered, rather than copied, the plaintiff’s arcade games.
Midway held the defendant manufacturers liable under a theory of
88. But see Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). In
a sense, the unauthorized solution book was a temporary, real-time alteration to the plaintiffs’
physics textbook. Much like the video-game cases discussed below, the solution book
complemented, plugged into, and added onto the original textbook. Moreover, the solution book
altered the manner in which consumers used the textbook—consumers used the solutions to help
answer (reverse engineer) the otherwise unaided problem sets in the textbook—and it was precisely
this unauthorized change in use to which the copyright owner objected, fearing that it would make
the textbook less marketable to professors. For more on Addison-Wesley, see supra notes 54–57.
89. See, e.g., Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
infringement because the defendant’s video game was “virtually identical in both sight and sound” to
the plaintiff’s game); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619–20
(7th Cir. 1982) (finding infringement because the defendant’s “K. C. Munchkin” video game copied
the “total concept and feel” of the plaintiff’s “PAC-MAN” video game); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding infringement because of evidence that the
replacement circuit boards in the defendant’s enhancement kit were copies of the original circuit
boards for plaintiff’s “PAC-MAN” video game).
90. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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contributory infringement.91 Because some of the replacement kits only
interacted with the plaintiff’s arcade game92—temporarily altering the
real-time game speed93—Artic found that a derivative work was created
by a noncopying, add-on component that altered an audiovisual work
only during real-time.94 Artic’s novel holding95 has been unwieldy, as the
following discussion demonstrates.
Artic even influenced courts confronted squarely with evidence of
copying, persuading some to rest their holdings on broad alteration
grounds, rather than evidence of copying. In 1986, two federal district
courts relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Artic to hold that the
defendants infringed the respective plaintiffs’ copyrights by
91. The arcade owners who installed the enhancement kits were the direct infringers. Id. at
1013 (“If, as we hold, the speeded-up ‘Galaxian’ game that a licensee creates with a circuit board
supplied by the defendant is a derivative work based upon ‘Galaxian,’ a licensee who lacks the
plaintiff’s authorization to create a derivative work is a direct infringer and the defendant is a
contributory infringer through its sale of the speeded-up circuit board.”).
92. The enhancement kit included replacement circuit boards that operated in the plaintiff’s
arcade game. There were actually two different circuit boards, however, at issue in Artic. In addition
to the circuit board that speeded-up plaintiff’s “Galaxian” game, the defendant also manufactured
and sold circuit boards that stored “a set of images and sounds almost identical to that stored in the
circuit boards of plaintiff’s ‘PAC-MAN’ video game machine.” Id. at 1010–11. In contrast, the
“Galaxian” replacement boards did not copy any of the elements of the plaintiff’s game—neither the
underlying program code nor the audiovisual displays of “Galaxian” were stored in the defendant’s
circuit boards. The “Galaxian” circuit boards merely interacted with the copyrighted work. Id. at
1010, 1013–14. Subsequent courts interpreting Artic have mistakenly concluded that all of the
defendant’s circuit boards copied from the plaintiff’s boards. See infra notes 113–114.
93. Although the replacement boards are physically attached to the arcade game—suggesting
that the alteration may be a static alteration, rather than a dynamic one—the configuration of game
components is not the copyrighted work, but rather the audiovisual display. Because the audiovisual
display of the game has not been permanently altered, the replacement boards are properly
considered as dynamic alterations.
94. Although acknowledging that “[a] speeded-up phonograph record is probably not” an
infringing derivative work, Artic, 704 F.2d at 1014 (citing, as cross-reference, Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (“The change in time of the
added chorus, and the slight variation in the base of the accompaniment, there being no change in
tune lyrics, would not be ‘new work.’”)), the court searched for a reason to hold speeded-up video
games to be infringing derivative works, resting its decision on the observation that there is no
market for speeded-up records in contrast to the market for speeded-up video games. Id. at 1013–14.
95. Although the copied “PAC-MAN” circuit boards in Artic, see supra note 92, could have
been decided on previous precedent, see supra note 89, the “Galaxian” circuit boards presented a
case of first impression—addressing whether third-party components that alter, without copying, a
plaintiff’s audiovisual displays create derivative works of those displays. Artic was a case of first
impression even though Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, also addressed an enhancement kit to speed up
game play. In Strohon, the replacement components were substantially similar to the original “PACMAN” circuit boards, supporting the inference that the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work. Id. at
752–53.
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manufacturing alternative cassette tapes that animated the then-popular
Teddy Ruxpin talking-bear toy.96 Although neither case addressed a
strictly noncopying alteration,97 the courts decided them as if they did.
Citing Artic, the courts ruled on infringement claims in such a way that
made the defendants’ copying practically irrelevant. In Worlds of
Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Systems, Inc.,98 the district court found
the case “analogous” to Artic.99
In this case, the Veritel cassette inserted into Teddy Ruxpin creates a
substantially similar audiovisual work which is altered in much the
same as a Galaxian game is altered by a speed up kit. Thus, the
modification of the copyrighted Teddy Ruxpin toy also falls within the
definition of derivative works.100

Thus, although Veritel might have rested its decision on evidence that the
defendant had copied the plaintiff’s works in order to make its own
tapes,101 it instead relied on the fact that the defendant’s tapes had
altered the plaintiff’s works. Significantly, Veritel did not consider
whether independently created tapes—that is, tapes that operated in the
Teddy Ruxpin toy but that did not mimic the stories, voice, or set of
movements from the plaintiff’s tapes—would have infringed the
derivative right. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental,
Inc.,102 a companion case in another district, however, did. Vector
96. Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex.
1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
The tapes at issue consist of two tracks: “The first track, the audio track, contains songs and stories;
the second track, the command track, contains digital information that activates the eyes, nose and
mouth.” Vector, 653 F. Supp. at 137; see also Veritel, 658 F. Supp. at 352. Together, these two
tracks animate the Teddy Ruxpin bear “in a life-like fashion as it plays songs and stories.” Vector,
653 F. Supp. at 137.
97. See infra notes 101–102.
98. 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
99. Id. at 355.
100. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
101. There was ample evidence of copying. Although the court noticed “some differences in
the voices on the tapes” and “some difference in the story line,” it nonetheless concluded that “[t]he
voice and animation of the tapes are similar,” and that “[t]he total concept and feel of the works is
substantially similar.” Id. at 355. Furthermore, the court observed that the person responsible for
programming the defendant’s tapes used the plaintiff’s work and that the actor who provided the
voice for the defendant’s tapes listened to the plaintiff’s tapes. Id. at 356.
102. 653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1986). In Vector, there was also evidence of copying.
Although the tapes in Vector only related public-domain fairy tales, rather than stories set in the
World of Teddy Ruxpin, id. at 137, the court noted substantial evidence that the defendant had
nonetheless copied the voice of the narrator, the method and sound for signaling the end of a page,
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suggested that even noncopied tapes would infringe the derivative right
because the copyright of the animated bear extends to every
configuration of the toy.103 Thus, although both cases addressed copying
alterations, the courts rested their holdings on noncopying grounds. In so
doing, they impliedly endorsed Artic’s holding that noncopying
alterations are infringing derivative works, even if the facts did not
properly present such a case.
Some courts, however, declined to extend Artic beyond its holding.
Two years following the Worlds of Wonder cases, the Fifth Circuit, in
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,104 declined to extend Artic, holding
that the defendant’s digital key was not a derivative work of the
plaintiff’s disk-protection device, even though the key effectively
circumvented the protection of the plaintiff’s device.105 The plaintiff
cited Artic, in the words of the court, “for the proposition that a product
and the visual impression of the eyes, nose, and mouth movement of the bear, id. at 139–40.
Furthermore, the court observed that the defendant had the plaintiff’s tape analyzed “to determine
how it could be duplicated.” Id. at 138. In conclusion, the court observed that “the general feel and
concept” of the defendant’s tapes were the same, and held the tapes were “[a]t least” derivative
works, even “if not an exact copy.” Id. at 140.
103. Id. The court observed,
[The plaintiffs] further argue that the copyright of Teddy Ruxpin as an audiovisual
work is limited to a specific series of images. They reason that their tapes create a series
of images different from those created by the [defendant’s] tapes. Therefore, they
conclude that they do not infringe.
Their position is neither practical nor credible as it would require a separate
copyright for each possible series of images. The language of the copyright is certainly
broad enough to include all movements which may be created by the animated bear.
Id. (discussing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)).
104. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
105. Id. As in Artic, see supra note 92, both copying and noncopying products were accused
of being derivative works in Vault. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 257–58. In Vault, the plaintiff produced
protective diskettes designed to prevent unauthorized duplication of programs distributed by
software companies. Id. at 256–57. The protective diskettes consisted of a “fingerprint” and a
verification program that prevented execution of the diskette contents unless the program identified
the diskette by the “fingerprint.” Id. The defendant produced diskettes that circumvented the
plaintiff’s protective mechanism. Id. at 257–58. The defendant’s diskettes operated even with
software copied from the plaintiff’s protected diskettes. Id. The defendant’s diskettes contained a
digital key that interacted with the plaintiff’s verification program—copied onto the defendant’s
diskettes along with the target software—to make it appear that the defendant’s diskette contained
the “fingerprint.” Id. One of the early versions of the defendant’s digital keys contained copied
characters found in the plaintiff’s verification program. Id. A later version, however, contained no
copied characters. Id. at 258. Thus, Vault addressed both copying and noncopying alterations. With
regard to the key containing copied elements, the Fifth Circuit held that the copied characters were
insufficient to create a derivative work, finding that the digital key with the copied characters was
not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s verification program. Id. at 268.
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can be a derivative work where it alters, rather than copies, the
copyrighted work.”106 The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to opine on
the merits of that proposition, deciding instead to distinguish Artic on the
basis that it did not hold the replacement circuit boards to be derivative
works, but rather the altered audiovisual displays caused by the
replacement boards. Because the plaintiff in Vault alleged that the digital
key itself was a derivative work, the court concluded that Artic was
inapplicable.107
Several years later, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc.108 substantially limited the holding of Artic by holding that a
different video-game component did not prepare derivative works. In
Lewis Galoob Toys, the Ninth Circuit rejected Nintendo’s claim that an
enhancement component (the “Game Genie”) created derivative works of
its copyrighted video games. Similar to the “Galaxian” circuit boards at
issue in Artic, the Game Genie in Lewis Galoob Toys altered the play of
the plaintiff’s copyrighted game.109 But unlike the “Galaxian” circuit
boards, the Game Genie was not a replacement part—it attached
independently to Nintendo’s game system.110 The Ninth Circuit found
this fact dispositive in distinguishing Artic,111 even though both
106. Vault, 847 F.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
107. Id. Vault’s reading of Artic is problematic. First, Vault concluded that Artic did not hold
the replacement boards to be derivative works because Artic held that the sale of the replacement
boards constituted contributory infringement, presuming apparently that only the altered audiovisual
displays, not the altered component system, were derivative works. Artic, however, held that the
arcade owners who installed the kits directly infringed, implying perhaps that the installation might
have created the derivative work. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether
Artic held infringing the installation or the execution of the enhancement kits. Second, if Vault is
correct that Artic did not hold the altered component system to be infringing, then Artic must hold
that any alteration to an audiovisual display creates a derivative work.
108. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. at 967 (“The Game Genie is a device . . . that allows the player to alter up to three
features of a Nintendo game. For example, the Game Genie can increase the number of lives of the
player’s character, increase the speed at which the character moves, and allow the character to float
above obstacles.”).
110. Compare id. (“The Game Genie is inserted between a game cartridge and the Nintendo
Entertainment System. The Game Genie does not alter the data that is stored in the game cartridge.
Its effects are temporary.” (emphasis added)), with Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d
1009, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Defendant sells printed circuit boards for use inside video game
machines. One of the circuit boards defendant sells speeds up the rate of play—how fast the sounds
and images change—of ‘Galaxian,’ one of plaintiff’s video games, when inserted in place of one of
the ‘Galaxian’ machine’s circuit boards.” (emphasis added)).
111. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 969. Interestingly, the court paid no special attention to
the fact that the “Galaxian” circuit boards and the Game Genie had the same practical effect—they
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enhancement kits had the same effect—speeding up game play.112 The
court also appears to have distinguished Artic on the basis that the
replacement “Galaxian” boards copied the plaintiff’s original boards.113
It is unclear, however, how the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
defendant’s “Galaxian” replacement boards copied the plaintiff’s original
boards, when Artic suggests the exact opposite.114 The court also
distinguished Mirage, concluding that, although the ceramic tiles
physically incorporated the copyrighted works, the Game Genie did
not.115
In Micro Star v. Formgen Inc.,116 the Ninth Circuit addressed yet
another video-game component and found, in this case, that the
component infringed the derivative right. Like previous cases, the
plaintiff, Formgen Inc., alleged infringement for the unauthorized
distribution of add-on components that modified the plaintiff’s video
games; unlike previous video-game cases, however, the plaintiff actually
supplied the users with the means to create the allegedly infringing
components. Formgen’s video game, “Duke Nukem 3D,” included a
“Build Editor,” which allowed game users to develop their own player
levels. Formgen also encouraged users to post their game levels on the
both speeded up the play of their respective host machines. The court did not indicate whether the
fact that the “Galaxian” circuit boards could only be used to speed up a single game, whereas the
Game Genie could speed up any Nintendo game played on the system, was relevant. (It likely was
not because both components worked with only one machine—it seems likely that the same or
similar circuit board might work in an arcade machine capable of playing multiple games.).
112. In addition, the Game Genie made other alterations. See supra note 109.
113. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 969 (“The defendant in Midway, Artic International,
marketed a computer chip that could be inserted in Galaxian video games to speed up the rate of
play. The Seventh Circuit held that the speeded-up version of Galaxian was a derivative work.
Artic’s chip substantially copied . . . the chip that was originally distributed by Midway.” (citation
omitted)).
114. In fact, it appears that the “Galaxian” boards did not copy. See supra note 92. It is unclear
from the opinion in Lewis Galoob Toys whether the court confused the two sets of circuit boards in
Artic or whether the court inferred copying of the “Galaxian” boards based on the admitted copying
of the “PAC-MAN” boards.
115. The court observed,
The Game Genie merely enhances the audiovisual displays (or underlying data bytes) that
originate in Nintendo game cartridges. The altered displays do not incorporate a portion
of
a
copyrighted
work
in
some
concrete
or
permanent
form.
. . . [In contrast, t]he ceramic tiles [in Mirage] physically incorporated the copyrighted
works in a form that could be sold.
Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 968.
116. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (defendant distributed user-generated game levels for
plaintiff’s video game).
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Internet for shared use by other users. When the defendant, Micro Star,
downloaded 300 user-created levels and sold them on a CD, Formgen
alleged infringement of the derivative right.117 Although Micro Star
arguably only copied the efforts of the game’s users, the court analogized
the game levels to motion picture sequels and held them to be derivative
works of the “Duke Nukem 3D” story itself.118
Although other noncopying-alteration controversies have divided
courts, there appears to be a general consensus, at least among several
federal district courts, that website-advertising technologies do not
prepare derivative works. Litigation over website advertising has
surfaced in two different contexts—framing (inline linking) and pop-up
dialogue boxes. In the late 1990s, several plaintiffs alleged infringement
after the respective defendant’s website “framed” the respective
plaintiff’s site.119 Websites that frame other sites contain inline links in
their own (host) sites that direct the user’s browser to display content
from the target (or framed) site within the frame of the host (or framing)
site.120 Frames might include a name or logo,121 links to other websites
(or other selectable options related either to the host’s or the target’s
business),122 and advertisements.123 Some frames mask or otherwise
partially obscure the target site, potentially modifying the appearance of
the content or advertising of the target site.124 The frame may even
replace the target site’s content or advertising with its own125—
117. Id. at 1109.
118. Id. at 1112.
119. N.Y. Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (defendant’s website framed plaintiff’s website); Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied
Anagramics Inc., No. CV 97-6991, 1998 WL 132922, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2005 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998)
(same); Complaint, Washington Post Co. v. TotalNews, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190, 1997 WL 33733041
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 1997) (same).
120. For further descriptions of framing, see, for example, Maureen A. O’Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 637–39 (1998); Aaron
Rubin, Comment, Are You Experienced? The Copyright Implications of Web Site Modification
Technology, 89 CAL. L. REV. 817, 821 (2001).
121. E.g., N.Y. Soc’y, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 339; Futuredontics, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 2008;
TotalNews, No. 97 Civ. 1190, para. 30.
122. E.g., N.Y. Soc’y, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 339; Futuredontics, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 2008.
123. E.g., N.Y. Soc’y, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 339; TotalNews, No. 97 Civ. 1190, para. 30.
124. E.g., TotalNews, No. 97 Civ. 1190, paras. 33, 36 (“Plaintiff Washington Post’s own
content, which is designed to occupy the entire screen, is partially obscured in order to fit inside
Defendants’ frame.”).
125. E.g., id. para. 36 (“Defendants also distort, and divert from, the content of Plaintiffs’ sites
that otherwise would be the only substantive material appearing on a user’s screen. Among other
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prompting some to refer to these as “parasitic website[s]”126 (or “parasites”127 for short).
Unfortunately, none of the courts that have entertained these
complaints have reached a decision on the merits of the copyright
claims,128 so whether framing prepares infringing derivative works is an
unanswered question before the courts. Legal commentators, however,
have not hesitated to offer their opinions.129 Although some parties and
commentators appear to characterize the host (or framing) sites as
reproducing the target (or framed) site,130 careful analysis of the inline
things, by juxtaposing advertising sold by Defendants against advertising sold by Plaintiffs on their
own sites, and by obscuring the advertising on Plaintiffs’ sites, Defendants directly compete against
Plaintiffs and interfere with Plaintiffs’ contractual relationships with advertisers.”).
126. E.g., id. paras. 1, 8.
127. E.g., Rubin, supra note 120, at 821.
128. N.Y. Soc’y, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (court declined to decide issue of copyright);
Futuredontics, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2005 (parties settled after court denied defendants’ motion to
dismiss); TotalNews, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (parties settled). Only in Futuredontics did the court
consider the arguments for alleged infringement of the derivative right. In ruling on the defendants’
motion to dismiss, the court decided only “that the cases cited by the parties do not conclusively
determine whether Defendants’ frame page constitutes a derivative work,” and subsequently denied
the defendants’ motion. Futuredontics, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 2010. The court considered both Mirage
and Lewis Galoob Toys, but concluded that both cases were distinguishable from framing. Id.
129. Commentators have compared framing to both the tile art at issue in Mirage and Lee, as
well as to the Game Genie at issue in Lewis Galoob Toys. Given the differences in both the facts and
the legal conclusions reached in these cases, it is not surprising that the commentators disagree over
whether or not framing sites recast, transform, or adapt the framed sites. Compare e.g., O’Rourke,
supra note 120, at 666 (1998) (“[Framing] is more a method of display than a transformation of the
framed work.” (emphasis added)), with Gregory C. Lisby, Web Site Framing: Copyright
Infringement Through the Creation of an Unauthorized Derivative Work, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 541,
555 (“[Framing] alters the framed Web sites, modifies it, re-packages it in a way its author did not
intend, and transforms it into something else entirely, altering the author’s copyrighted work by
integrating it into something else the author did not create nor authorize.” (emphasis added)).
Internet framing, and linking in general, implicates a host of intellectual property issues
beyond just the derivative right, including trademark infringement and dilution, passing off, false
advertising, copyright infringement (of the reproduction and display rights, as well as the derivative
right), misappropriation, and unfair competition. For a comprehensive analysis of the various issues,
see, for example, O’Rourke, supra; Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking at Five
Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273 (2001).
130. See, e.g., Futuredontics, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 2010 (“Plaintiff’s complaint, however, alleges
that defendants reproduce its copyrighted web page by combining AAI [defendant] material and
Plaintiff’s web site.” (emphasis added)); TotalNews, No. 97 Civ. 1190, para. 8 (“Defendants have
designed a parasitic website that republishes the news and editorial content of others’ websites in
order to attract both advertisers and users.” (emphasis added)); Raymond Chan, Internet Framing:
Complement or Hijack?, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 143, 170 (1999) (“TotalNews’
framing resulted in a literal copying of Time’s [plaintiff’s] copyrighted work.” (emphasis added));
Sableman, supra note 129, at 1297 (2001) (“[Framing] is a little bit like painting a picture of a
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linking at issue demonstrates that host sites merely direct the user’s
browser to display the target site within the host site; thus, the frames
alter or modify the real-time appearance of the framed sites, but they do
not reproduce them.131 Whether framing will be determined to infringe
the derivative right is an important question because of the scope of
Internet technologies that may utilize it in one way or another.132

gallery at the Louvre, by simply importing onto your canvas the Louvre’s own digital reproductions
of those drawings.” (emphasis added)). It is difficult to determine whether Chan intends to suggest
that host sites reproduce the target site. “Time’s [the plaintiff’s] copyrighted material was mounted
within an electronic visual frame designed by TotalNews. However, TotalNews did not directly
republish Time’s copyrighted material. . . . Thus, the issue is whether TotalNews’ on-line
republication of Time’s copyrighted material constituted direct derivative work infringement.”
Chan, supra, at 167 (emphasis added). It is likewise unclear whether Sableman suggests that framing
reproduces the target sites. Sableman, supra note 129, at 1297–1301. Notwithstanding the parties
and commentators that appear to suggest that framing sites literally copy or otherwise reproduce the
framed site, commentators careful to examine the precise technical details of framing, conclude
otherwise. See infra note 131.
131. Rubin’s student comment provides an excellent technical description of framing. “[N]one
of the [website modification] technologies under consideration reproduce the HTML code of the
underlying Web pages.” Rubin, supra note 120, at 830. Instead framing websites point the user’s
browser to the targeted location and cause the target website to be displayed in the user’s browser
surrounded, and potentially visually modified, by the framing site. Id. at 830–31. Thus, “[f]or
framing and in-line links in general, then, the copying into RAM of a Web page’s HTML code and
the displaying of its images occurs only on the end user’s computer and not on the framing site’s
server.” Id. at 831. Significantly, “the copying and displaying that take place on an end user’s
computer is exactly the same kind of copying and displaying that take place any time a user accesses
a Web page.” Id. Properly understood, the controversy surrounding framing does not involve the
reproduction of the target website, but rather the real-time modification to the target site that the
framing page causes to appear in the user’s browser. Thus, there is no multiplying or copying of the
framed pages.
Similarly, other commentators conclude that framing sites do not reproduce the framed sites.
Another student comment concludes: “Web page designers, therefore, do not actually have to
reproduce any of the ‘outside’ web site to create a web page that utilizes frames. They must simply
create a hyperlink to the other web site.” Michael A. Stoker, Comment, Framed Web Pages:
Framing the Derivative Works Doctrine on the World Wide Web, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1301, 1307
(1999) (emphasis added). Stoker analyzed the differences between static and nonstatic frames and
even provided some example HTML code to explain his conclusion. Id. at 1306–07. Although at one
point O’Rourke’s article might suggest reproduction, O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 633 (“A site that
utilizes framing has the ability to bring up the entire contents or portions of one of more other sites
that are ‘framed’ within the linking site.” (emphasis added)), the article later makes clear that it is the
user’s browser, not the framing website, that reproduces the framed webpage, id. (“The user’s
machine sends a request for the document to be linked to the document owner’s server, which makes
a copy and sends it back to the user’s machine.”). The significant question, then, is whether
modifying the user’s authorized reproduction of the framed site prepares a derivative work.
132. For an insightful study of Internet technologies that modify or alter target websites
(through either framing or other means), including comparison-shopping, commentary, ad-stripping,
and customization applications, see Rubin, supra note 120, at 819 (concluding that “employing
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More recently, litigation over website advertising has focused on the
use of pop-up windows, which have been consistently found not to
infringe the derivative right. District courts across the country have
entertained complaints (alleging, inter alia, infringement of the
derivative right) against two advertising network operators, WhenU.com
(“WhenU”) and the Gator Corporation133 (“Gator”).134 WhenU and
Gator “bundle” ad-ware programs with certain applications freely
available for downloading (such as a weather forecasting desktop
display).135 Once installed, the ad-ware program causes site-specific,136
third-party137 advertisements to appear whenever the user browses a
targeted website.138 The owners of these sites might object to these popup advertisements for many reasons. For instance, pop-up ads may
interfere with the visitors’ use of the targeted site,139 may confuse

technologies that modify how a user experiences a Web page does not typically infringe a Web site
owner’s exclusive rights under copyright law”). Rubin explains, in detail, each implicated
technology. Id. at 820–26.
133. The Gator Corporation has apparently changed its name to Claria Corporation. See
http://www.gator.com.
134. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(defendant’s software triggered pop-up advertisements to appear when users browsed plaintiff’s
website), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same); Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp.,
2002 WL 31356645 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002) (same).
For a detailed account of the factual background in these cases, see Jill E.C. Yung, Comment,
Virtual Spaces Formed by Literary Works: Should Copyright or Property Rights (or Neither) Protect
the Functional Integrity and Display of a Web Site?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 495 (2004).
135. Yung, supra note 134, at 499.
136. See, e.g., Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (“WhenU’s participating consumers
receive contextually relevant advertisements, delivered to their computer screens . . . . These
advertisements are selected by SaveNow [ad-ware program], based on a proprietary analysis of the
consumer’s immediate interests, as reflected by the consumer’s Internet browsing activity.”).
137. See, e.g., U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (“To maintain its business, WhenU sells
advertising space and opportunities to merchants that want to take advantage of the SaveNow [adware].”).
138. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 499–500. Gator apparently warns users that,
in exchange for the free application, the bundled ad-ware will cause “‘occasional’ pop-up
advertisements based on their online browsing behavior.” Id. at 500. In contrast, WhenU “buries the
consequences of downloading products bundled” with its ad-ware. Id. at 501.
139. See, e.g., id. at 479 (“Plaintiff argues the ‘pop-up advertisements also interfere with and
disrupt the carefully designed display of content’ on Plaintiff’s copyrighted website.”).
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visitors as to the true source of the advertisements,140 and/or may
discourage visitors of the targeted sites from returning.141 Plaintiffs have
alleged, inter alia, that the ad-ware programs prepare derivative works
because the pop-up advertisements modify the appearance and
presentation of the plaintiffs’ websites (on the screen of the ad-ware
user).142
To date, no district court has held that these ad-ware programs
prepare derivative works.143 These courts have relied on either Lee or
Lewis Galoob Toys to reach essentially the same conclusion that pop-up
ads do not recast, transform, or adapt the target websites because the ads
do not change the sites.144 The two courts that relied on Lee reasoned
140. See, e.g., id. at 479–80 nn.26–30 (detailing the results of a survey “conducted . . . to
determine whether Defendants’ pop-up advertising scheme was likely to cause confusion as to the
source of the pop-up advertisements”).
141. Although it appears from current cases that plaintiffs have not alleged that pop-up ads
discourage visitors from returning to their own websites, legal commentators and computer industry
analysts have questioned whether Internet users would consider not returning to a particular site
because of the presence of pop-up ads. See Yung, supra note 134.
142. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 486 (“Plaintiff argues that to infringe their
derivative work right, Defendants need not have made a copy of the original work in order to create
a derivative work, and that to violate its protected right to prepare derivative works, Defendants need
only transform or recast the copyrighted work in some way, as by adding to or deleting from
Plaintiff’s copyrighted website.” (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)). It is noteworthy
that the plaintiff cited Aymes v. Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1995), for the proposition that an
original work need not be copied in order to prepare a derivative of that work. 1-800 Contacts, 309
F. Supp. 2d at 486 n.39. The court, however, distinguished Aymes on the ground that that case dealt
with an alteration to the underlying computer code. Id. Without expressly saying so, the court rested
this distinction on the fact that the plaintiff never alleged that the pop-up ads modified or altered the
underlying code of the plaintiff’s website. Id. The court declined to comment on whether a work
must copy a preexisting work (or multiply elements of it) in order to constitute a derivative work. Id.
The Second Circuit appears to hold in Aymes that mere modification of a preexisting copy is
sufficient to prepare a derivative work; however, Aymes does not elaborate on this point (merely
assuming that a software adaptation is a derivative work) and immediately proceeds to analyze the
case under § 117.
143. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (denying motion for preliminary injunction
only on copyright claims); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 773
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion for preliminary injunction on all claims, including copyright); UHaul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (E.D. Va. 2003) (granting summary
judgment to defendants, based in part on finding no infringement of the derivative right). But see
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., 2002 WL 31356645 (E.D. Va. July 16,
2002) (granting motion for preliminary injunction without opining on the merits of the claims,
including copyright infringement).
144. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (“Defendants’ pop-up ads may ‘obscure’ or
‘cover’ a portion of Plaintiff’s website—but they do not ‘change’ the website, and accordingly do
not ‘recast, transform or adapt’ the website” (citing Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.
1997))); Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (“If one were able to look at the HTML code of
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that pop-up ads could not be derivative works because it would mean that
a user creates a derivative work upon opening any window while another
is already open.145 Notwithstanding the defendants’ success with regards
to the copyright claims, some of the plaintiffs have enjoined the
distribution of the respective defendant’s programs, at least temporarily,
on other grounds (such as trademark infringement);146 moreover, other
actions are still pending.147
Of all the controversies arising from noncopying alterations, the
most publicized controversy surrounds home-video filtering (and
editing). Home-video filtering companies produce data filters that
instruct digital video disc players to skip images and mute sounds
marked as objectionable by prescreening employees of the filter
companies. As explained in Part I, home-video filtering became the
subject of litigation after a franchisee of the popular video-editing
company CleanFlicks initiated a lawsuit against the Directors Guild of

plaintiffs’ sites, one would not see any changes as a result of WhenU’s advertisements. In this
respect, the effect of WhenU’s advertisements on plaintiffs’ sites is more akin to the affect of a video
game accessory in Lewis Galoob Toys.”); U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (“WhenU’s ad is merely
another window on the user’s computer desktop. The pop-up ad may modify the user’s computer
display; however, this modification does not consist [sic] copyright infringement.” (citing Lee, 125
F.3d at 582)). The U-Haul decision makes this point by implication. The court noted that a pop-up
modifies the user’s computer display, and then concluded without explanation that such a
modification does not prepare a derivative work. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 731. The court noted
previously that, in relation to the trademark claim, “the SaveNow [ad-ware] program does not
change the underlying appearance of the U-Haul website.” Id. at 729. Thus, when the court later
concluded that a modification to the user’s screen would not be sufficient to prepare a derivative
work, it may have meant to imply that a derivative work may not be prepared unless there is some
modification to the underlying appearance of the target website—or in other words, a derivative
work is not prepared unless the underlying work is changed. Id. at 731.
145. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 487–88 (“[I]f obscuring a browser window containing
a copyrighted website with another computer window produces a ‘derivative work,’ then any action
by a computer user that produced a computer window or visual graphic that altered the screen
appearance of Plaintiff’s website, however slight, would require Plaintiff’s permission.”); U-Haul,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (“To conclude otherwise [that pop-ups infringe copyright] is untenable in
light of the fact that the user is the one who controls how items are displayed on the computer
[ostensibly by installing the ad-ware], and computer users would infringe copyrighted works any
time they opened a window in front of a copyrighted Web page . . . .”).
146. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (granting motion for preliminary injunction on
trademark and cybersquatting claims, which was reversed on appeal), rev’d, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir.
2005); Washingtonpost.Newsweek, 2002 WL 31356645 (granting motion for preliminary injunction
without explanation of the grounds for decision).
147. See, e.g., In re The Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litig., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (consolidating similar actions in multiple districts). For more regarding this consolidated
action, as well as other potentially pending actions, see Yung, supra note 134, at 521–22.
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America. Because Congress intervened—expressly exempting video
filtering from copyright infringement with the Family Movie Act of
2005148—before a substantive decision was reached in the case, the
controversy is mentioned here only briefly. Although the video-filtering
companies were recently dismissed as parties to the case—in light of the
Family Movie Act of 2005—litigation is still pending with respect to
several video-editing companies.149 Video filtering (and editing) will be
discussed in more detail below in Part IV.B.3.
In summary, courts have inconsistently decided cases addressing
noncopying alterations under the 1976 Copyright Act. As the previous
discussion observed, some courts have found that unauthorized,
noncopying alterations infringe the derivative right, while other courts
have not. Even courts that reach similar outcomes do not arrive at their
conclusions for the same reasons. Owing, at least in part, to the
unpredictable case law surrounding noncopying alterations, Congress has
already intervened in one recent controversy, expressly authorizing
video-filtering technologies.
IV. EMPHASIZING THE COPY IN COPYRIGHT
To avoid continued uncertainty in litigation and to remedy the future
need for additional congressional intervention, this Comment proposes a
simple solution: requiring evidence of copying—that is, evidence of the
intentional multiplication of embodiments of the allegedly infringed
work—before finding infringement of the derivative right. This solution
does not require new legislation150 or new judicial doctrine.151 It simply
requires courts to reemphasize a basic principle of copyright law—there
is no copyright infringement, even of the derivative right, without

148. Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110,
15 U.S.C. § 1114).
149. See, e.g., John Accola, A Win for Movie Sanitizers: Judge Drops Two Companies from
Copyright Lawsuit, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 19, 2005, at 2B, available at 2005 WLNR
13068749.
150. Other authors have suggested legislative amendments. See, e.g., Naomi Abe Veogtli,
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (advocating legislation of a less
expansive definition of the derivative right).
151. Other authors have suggested crafting new judicial doctrines. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa,
Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the
Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991 (2004)
(advocating the adoption of the rule that the derivative right is dependent upon the other exclusive
rights).
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evidence of copying. In short, this Comment urges courts to emphasize
the copy in copyright. Although holding noncopying alterations not to
infringe the derivative right is contrary to at least two federal appellate
court precedents, those decisions are either much maligned, generally
misunderstood, and/or directly in conflict with the holdings of other
circuits. Thus, requiring evidence of copying does not require a
significant course change in federal case law. Even more importantly,
this requirement would result in more consistent and predictable
outcomes for present and future litigation over noncopying alterations,
avoiding the need for narrow legislative exemptions, such as the Family
Movie Act of 2005.152 This Part first argues why noncopying alterations
do not prepare infringing derivative works, and then analyzes how past
and present controversies would be resolved by requiring evidence of
copying before finding infringement of the derivative right.
A. Why Noncopying Alterations Do Not Prepare
Infringing Derivative Works
Simply stated, noncopying alterations do not prepare infringing
derivative works because they do not copy. Traditionally, copying has
been a necessary element to prove infringement, and the 1976 Copyright
Act did not change this fundamental requirement. In addition, as
demonstrated below, the text of the 1976 Copyright Act implies that
noncopying alterations do not prepare infringing derivative works
because a work may not be based upon another work unless the
derivative copied, in some degree or other, the original. Thus, this
Section first argues that the general requirement for evidence of copying
to prove infringement applies to the modern derivative right, and then
argues that the “based upon” text of the 1976 Act specifically implies
requiring evidence of copying to prove infringement of the derivative
right.
1. The general requirement for evidence of copying to prove
infringement applies to the modern derivative right
Evidence of copying has long been a bedrock requirement for any
claim of copyright infringement. One prominent commentator went as

152. Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110,
15 U.S.C. § 1114).
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far as to call it a principle of “copyright gospel” that copyright
“infringement will be found only if defendant’s work copies from
plaintiff’s [work].”153 As shown below, this conclusion, as applied to the
present-day reproduction right, is safely rooted in the Supreme Court’s
consistent interpretation of copyright as conferring the right to multiply
copies—or, by negative implication, as conferring the right to exclude
others from multiplying copies. Its broad implication—that infringement
of the derivative right requires evidence of copying—is, admittedly,
more difficult to confirm.
a. Traditionally, copyright infringement required proof of copying.
During the years that the derivative right developed, the Supreme Court
repeatedly affirmed that copyright protected only against copying.
Interpreting the original Copyright Act of 1790, the Court observed, in
Stephens v. Cady,154 “The copy-right is an exclusive right to the
multiplication of copies.”155 At the time, copyright only granted authors
the exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing or vending”;156
subsequent cases, however, continued to define copyright as the right to
multiply copies, even though Congress had expanded copyright to
include additional derivative rights. For instance, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus157 defined the “main purpose of the copyright statutes” to be “the
right to multiply copies,”158 even though the 1870 Act had already
expanded copyright protection to include the rights to translate and to
dramatize works. Arguably, these additional derivative rights were not
the “main purpose” of copyright, but were merely incidental protections.
Mazer v. Stein159 concluded unequivocally, however, “The copyright
protects originality rather than novelty or invention—conferring only

153. Goldstein, supra note 11, at 218 (emphasis added).
154. 55 U.S. 528 (1852).
155. Id. at 530 (holding that the defendant’s purchase of a copperplate engraving of the
plaintiff’s copyrighted map did not confer the right to multiply copies of the map).
156. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
157. 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that a copyright owner could not, by virtue of the
copyright, enforce a minimum retail price against subsequent wholesale purchasers who sold the
works at retail below the minimum price).
158. Id. at 347 (citing Stephens, 55 U.S. at 530).
159. 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (holding that the intended use of porcelain figures as bases for table
lamps did not disqualify the figures from copyright protection).
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‘the sole right of multiplying copies.’”160 Significantly, Mazer
interpreted the 1909 Act, which granted the most expansive protection
for derivative rights prior to the 1976 Act.161 How then could Mazer
conclude that copyright conferred only the sole right to multiply copies
when the statute presently enumerated derivative rights in addition to the
traditional reproduction rights162 of printing, reprinting, and publishing?
One reasonable explanation is that the Court considered derivative
works, such as translations and dramatizations, to be copies of original
works in the same manner that a reproduction was considered to be a
copy. Under this interpretation of Mazer, the addition of derivative rights
to the statute did not change the fundamental purpose of copyright,
which was to prohibit the unauthorized multiplication of copies—that is,
unauthorized copying—because derivative works were, by implication,
considered to be copies as well. Accordingly, Mazer’s subsequent
observation—“Absent copying there can be no infringement of
copyright”163 —was, by implication, equally applicable to infringement
of the derivative copyrights. As such, there could have been no
infringement of these derivative rights absent evidence of copying—that
is, absent some proof that the defendant had multiplied copies of the
plaintiff’s work by, for instance, creating a translation or dramatization
based upon that work.
Significantly, the Supreme Court never found copyright infringement
absent at least some evidence of copying, which supports the inference
that copying was a requirement for all infringement cases, including
alleged infringement of the then-recognized derivative rights.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court never directly addressed whether
evidence of copying was required for alleged infringement of the thenrecognized derivative rights.
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, however, lower courts consistently
rejected attempts to expand copyright to prohibit noncopying activities,
such as noncopying alterations, as demonstrated in Part III.A. For

160. Id. at 218 (quoting Jewelers Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir. 1922)).
161. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
162. The “reproduction” right, as such, was not introduced until the 1976 Act, see 17 U.S.C. §
106(1), but it is used here to describe its predecessor rights.
163. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (citing, inter alia, White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co.
209 U.S. 1 (1908); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)).
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instance, courts found no infringement for rebinding books,164 for
binding comic magazines together,165 for manufacturing handbags from
designed fabric,166 for repainting a hobbyhorse,167 or for affixing designs
removed from greeting cards and notepads to ceramic plaques.168 In each
case, the defendant never copied—that is, never intentionally multiplied
embodiments of—the respective plaintiff’s works. One of these courts, in
reaching its conclusion, relied expressly on the Supreme Court’s
characterization of copyright as the exclusive right to multiply copies. In
Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co.,169 the defendant
purchased secondhand copies of plaintiff’s comic book and subsequently
bound them together with other comic publications (not owned by the
plaintiff).170 Fawcett, citing Bobbs-Merrill, noted: “The decisions appear
to be uniform that the purpose and effect of the copyright statute is to
secure to the owner thereof the exclusive right to multiply copies.”171
Accordingly, Fawcett held that there was no copyright infringement
because “the defendant ha[d] not multiplied copies but merely resold the
plaintiff’s under a different cover.”172 Many other courts similarly found
the absence of copying to be the dispositive issue.173
In summary, prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
held expressly that copyright infringement, in general, requires evidence
of copying. Moreover, the Supreme Court never found copyright
infringement absent proof of copying. Finally, almost all of the lower
courts deciding noncopying-alteration cases rejected infringement claims
on the basis that copyright infringement requires evidence of copying.
But do the same principles of copyright infringement, formed during
the years when copyright primarily prohibited only unauthorized

164. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
169. 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
170. For more on Fawcett, see supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
171. 46 F. Supp. at 718 (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (finding no
infringement because there was no proof of copying); Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F.
Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same). For more on C.M. Paula, see supra notes 50–53 and
accompanying text. For more on Blazon, see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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reproductions,174 apply to the modern-day derivative right? Specifically,
does the traditional infringement requirement for proof of copying apply
to claims against noncopying alterations alleged to be derivative works
under the 1976 Copyright Act?
b. Feist preserved the traditional infringement requirement for proof
of copying even after the 1976 Act. When the Court decided Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,175 interpreting the
1976 Act, it stated emphatically, “The sine qua non of copyright is
originality.”176 In other words, without originality there is no copyright.
Originality, according to Feist, means that “the work was independently
created by the author, as opposed to [being] copied from other works,
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”177 By
implication, complete originality precludes a finding of copyright
infringement.178 Even more directly, Feist held, “To establish
infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.”179 Thus, even after the inclusion of the broadly defined,
modern-day derivative right in the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme
Court restated the traditional rule that copyright infringement requires
proof of copying. Although the facts at issue only implicated the
reproduction right, not the derivative right,180 Feist, nevertheless, did not
174. See supra Part II; see also Goldstein, supra note 11, at 219 (“The rules on copyright
infringement were shaped in the years before derivative rights were added to the statute, when the
only question was whether defendant’s work constituted a copy of plaintiff’s.”). Ironically, what
used to be the “only question” in infringement cases is rarely discussed thoroughly in derivative
rights cases addressing noncopying alterations.
175. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
176. Id. at 345.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. A work, of course, may be copyrightable and still be an infringing work. If, for instance,
a work contained both copied and original elements (and a minimum degree of creativity), then it
would be copyrightable (for the original elements) but nonetheless an infringing work (for the copied
elements). In some cases, it may be possible to separate the copyrightable original elements from the
copied elements, but in other cases, it is likely that the mixed elements are inseparable. The
implication of Feist, however, is that a completely original work is completely copyrightable, and
therefore not capable (in whole or in part) of being an infringing work.
179. Id. at 361 (emphasis added) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).
180. Feist speaks of infringement in general terms, never specifically referencing the
reproduction right in 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), though it appears uncontroversial that the reproduction
right, not the derivative right, was implicated.
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make its infringement formula contingent on the reproduction right,
making it presumptively applicable to the derivative right.
Whether the infringement formula stated in Feist applies beyond the
reproduction right should be the threshold question for any court
deciding an infringement claim regarding the derivative right.
Surprisingly, no lower courts addressing derivative-works cases have
asked this question. Although most, if not all, courts addressing allegedly
copying derivative works—that is, derivative works that have allegedly
copied original works—determine whether, in fact, there is evidence of
copying,181 courts addressing noncopying alterations have not directly
addressed the question. Some have cited the infringement formula in
Feist,182 and others have cited similar formulations,183 but many courts
have ignored any infringement formula requiring proof of copying.184
Even more problematic, courts that have required proof of copying have
found infringement absent any such proof.185 Furthermore, those courts

181. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal.
April 25, 1989).
182. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(citing Feist), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same); Lee v. Deck the Walls, Inc.,
925 F. Supp. 576, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing a Seventh Circuit decision citing Feist), aff’d, Lee v.
A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
183. See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To succeed
on the merits of its [infringement] claim . . . [the plaintiff] must show . . . copying of protected
expression.”); Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramics Inc., No. CV 97-6991, 1998 WL 132922,
45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2005, 2009 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998) (“To establish copyright infringement, Plaintiff
must prove . . . that Defendants copied Plaintiff’s copyrighted work.” (citing Smith v. Jackson, 84
F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996))); Greenwich Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc., 932 F.
Supp. 1210, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Copyright infringement is demonstrated by proof of . . .
‘copying’ by the defendants.” (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148,
1151 (9th Cir. 1986))); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 819
(D. Kan. 1989) (“There are two basic elements to a claim for copyright infringement: (1) plaintiff’s
ownership of the copyright; and (2) defendant’s ‘copying’ of the work protected by copyright.”
(citing Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1142 (8th Cir. 1989))); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v.
Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 138 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (“To establish infringement of
copyright [the plaintiff] must show . . . copying by the defendants.” (citing Eckes v. Card Prices
Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984))).
184. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1997); Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992); Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
185. See, e.g., Micro Star, 154 F.3d 1107; Greenwich, 932 F. Supp. 1210; Vector, 653 F.
Supp. 135. There was evidence in Micro Star of copying—the defendants admittedly copied the
MAP files that game users had posted on the Internet. The appellate court, however, never expressly
explained what the defendant copied from the plaintiff. Alleging that the altered video-game levels
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that have not found infringement have based their decisions on reasons
other than absence of copying.186 Only a very small minority of courts
appear to have concluded that noncopying alterations do not infringe
because they do not copy.187 The apparent inattention to Feist’s formula
in cases addressing noncopying alterations, as well as the corresponding
confusion over evidence of copying, may be attributable, primarily, to
two factors: (1) many noncopying alterations appear to copy; and (2)
copying has been redefined by some to mean infringement of any
exclusive copyright, including the derivative right.
(1) Many noncopying alterations appear to copy. Many
noncopying alterations appear to meet all of the standard elements for
establishing circumstantial proof of copying—that is, the elements
articulated by the seminal Second Circuit opinion in Arnstein v.
Porter188—including: (1) access to the copyrighted work, and (2)
substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly
infringing work. In every noncopying-alteration case, the defendant had
access to the copyrighted work. In fact, it was the acknowledged
business practice of each defendant to alter copies of the respective
plaintiff’s works; proof of access, therefore, was obvious. Furthermore,
altered copies appear substantially similar to the original copies.
Speeded-up video-game play appears substantially similar to unaltered
game play;189 prints affixed to ceramic tiles appear substantially similar
to those same prints before affixation;190 and filtered home-video

are sequels is as close as the court came. Similarly, there was also evidence of copying in Vector.
The district court, however, appears to have rested its decision on noncopying grounds.
186. For example, the website framing case 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, cited Feist,
see supra note 182, but did not decide the case on the absence of copying, but rather on the basis that
the frames did not change the plaintiff’s work. 1-800 Contacts, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (“Defendants’
pop-up ads may ‘obscure’ or ‘cover’ a portion of Plaintiff’s website—but they do not ‘change’ the
website, and accordingly do not ‘recast, transform or adapt’ the website.” (citing Lee, 125 F.3d at
582)).
187. See, e.g., Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 580 (“Both framing and tiling utilize the same
works purchased from the copyright holder and do not involve ‘copying’ as defined by the
Copyright Act.”), aff’d on other grounds, Lee, 125 F.3d 580; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Ltd., 847 F.2d
255, 268 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that the . . .
copying was not significant and that this version . . . was not a substantially similar copy . . . .”).
188. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
189. For more on speeded-up video games, see, for example, supra notes 90–95.
190. For more on prints affixed to ceramic tiles, see supra notes 72–82.
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playback appears substantially similar to unfiltered playback.191 Thus,
some courts have summarily concluded that altered copies were
substantially similar to the original copies.192 What these courts have
neglected is the most fundamental, but most understated, element of
copying—multiplication of embodiments of the work. The defendants in
the above-mentioned alteration cases—speeded-up video games, tile art,
and filtered home videos—did not create additional copies (or
embodiments); instead they altered existing copies. Courts have
improperly analyzed the elements for circumstantial proof of copying
without ever asking, in the first place, whether there was actual
copying—that is, intentional multiplication of embodiments of the work.
In most infringement cases, implicating either the reproduction or the
derivative right, the “multiplying element” of copying is obvious, and
courts do not even bother proving the point, answering instead whether
the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and whether the work
created by the defendant sufficiently resembles the plaintiff’s work such
that the court may reasonably infer that the defendant copied the
plaintiff’s work. Courts rarely must answer whether the defendant
created something additional in the first place. For instance, in deciding
whether one musical composition reproduced another composition,193
there was no need for the court to prove that the allegedly copying
composition was an additional creation; the only question was whether
that additional creation embodied the original composition. The same
was true with regards to an allegedly copied theatrical play194 and an
allegedly copied illustration.195
Similarly, courts often assume the “multiplying element” for
infringement claims in derivative-works cases. Thus, courts did not
address whether a motion picture based on a book196 or a sequel based
on a previous movie197 multiplied embodiments of these respective
works. Again, such multiplication was obvious because the defendants
created embodiments of their works in addition to the existing

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
1989).

For more on filtered home videos, see supra note 271 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998).
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911).
See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. April 25,
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embodiments of the respective plaintiff’s works. Accordingly, the
question before the courts, in most infringement cases, is whether the
defendant had access to the plaintiff’s works and whether the defendant’s
creations sufficiently resemble the plaintiff’s works—that is, whether the
defendant copied the plaintiff’s works.
This problem is easily correctible. Courts simply must be advised
that noncopying alterations do not necessarily copy the original works
they alter; some alterations modify existing copies, without multiplying
additional copies (or embodiments), of works. Emphasizing the
“multiplying element” of copying preserves the underlying motivation
for copyright, as articulated by the Supreme Court—protecting the right
to multiply copies (or embodiments).
(2) Copying has been redefined by some to mean infringement of
any exclusive copyright, including the derivative right. The apparent
inattentiveness to Feist’s infringement formula may also be attributable
to the sentiment that “copying” is “shorthand” for infringing any of the
exclusive rights in Section 106 of the Copyright Act.198 If “copying” just
means infringing one of the exclusive rights, then any infringement of
the derivative right would necessarily be copying, making Feist’s
requirement for evidence of copying tautological. Although only a few
courts have expressly held that “copying” means infringement of any
exclusive copyright,199 many more courts appear to agree tacitly, either
leaping immediately into the question of whether a work is derivative
without ever addressing whether the defendant copied the plaintiff,200 or
deciding cases for reasons other than evidence of copying.201 The

198. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 8.02[A], at 8-28 (“Accordingly,
‘copying’ is ‘shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights’ set
forth in Section 106 of the Copyright Act.” (footnote omitted)) (noting that the subsequent expansion
in 1995 of Section 106 to encompass six rights did not change the proposition).
199. See, e.g., Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 578 (“‘Copying’ means infringing upon a
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.”); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F.
Supp. 808, 819 (D. Kan. 1989) (“‘Copying’ is the shorthand reference to the act of infringing any of
the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 106.” (citing S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989))).
200. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th
Cir. 1992) (leaping directly into the definition of a derivative work without ever addressing the
requirement for copying to prove infringement).
201. See, e.g., Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 140
(N.D. Ohio 1986). Vector went through the standard steps for analyzing evidence of copying—
access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the works. Id. at 138. Vector,
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unfortunate consequence of this tautology is that it removes the most
fundamental element of copyright—evidence of copying—and thus
opens the door for infringement suits against noncopying defendants.
Requiring evidence of copying for every case of copyright
infringement, however, is potentially problematic because, arguably,
some of the exclusive rights may be infringed without copying. The 1976
Act granted copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce copies
of,202 to prepare derivative works based upon,203 to distribute copies
of,204 to perform publicly,205 and to display publicly their copyrighted
works.206 Arguably, defendants who distribute or display unauthorized
copies have not themselves copied. Thus, copyright infringement—at
least of the distribution and display rights—does not require proof of the
defendant’s copying. If the distribution and the display rights appear to
deal with unauthorized uses, not unauthorized copying, of protected
works, does the derivative right, therefore, also address unauthorized
uses, not just unauthorized copying?
Interpreting the derivative right to prohibit unauthorized uses is not
reasonable given the historical development of the derivative right. In a
sense, the derivative right and the performance right grew out of the
early reproduction right as part of a gradually expanding view of what
constituted unauthorized copying. Understood as such, the reproduction
right excludes literal copying;207 the derivative right excludes copying
into alternative mediums or markets;208 and the performance right
excludes copying in live productions.209 Describing the reproduction,
derivative, and performance rights as “copying” rights is consistent with
however, did not limit the scope of the infringement to only the copied expression, concluding
instead, “The language of the copyright is certainly broad enough to include all movements which
may be created by the animated bear.” Id. at 140. Thus, even if the defendant’s tapes had animated
the toy bear in a completely different manner than the plaintiff’s tapes, the court would have found
infringement by the defendant for having configured the plaintiff’s toy.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
203. Id. § 106(2).
204. Id. § 106(3).
205. Id. § 106(4). Later amendment expanded the performance right to include digital audio
transmissions of sound recordings. See id. § 106(6).
206. Id. § 106(5).
207. Id. § 106(1). The reproduction right has extended beyond literal copying, but for purposes
here it is sufficient to describe it as literal copying.
208. Id. § 106(2). For more on this market-oriented conception of the derivative right, see
Goldstein, supra note 11.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6).
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the historical expansion of copyright, as discussed in Part II, in which
Congress gradually extended copyright to include protection against
unauthorized theater performances210 and against unauthorized
derivative works, such as translations211 and dramatizations.212 If the
derivative right enumerated in the 1976 Act “merely restat[ed]
preexisting law in a more simple and concise way,”213 then infringement
of the modern-day derivative right requires proof of copying consistent
with the pre-1976 case law described in Part III.A. Interpreting the
derivative right, in contrast, as prohibiting unauthorized uses, such as
alterations, would be a drastic expansion of copyright, effectively
providing copyright owners with full claim to “moral rights” in their
works. Arguably, the Visual Rights Act of 1990214 introduced limited
protection for “moral rights.” At least one appellate court, however, has
expressed reluctance to provide through the “back door”—that is,
through an expansive definition of the derivative right—that which
Congress deliberately omitted from the Visual Rights Act.215
If, however, copyright infringement requires proof of copying how
are the distribution and the display rights to be understood? Although
there is no need for evidence of copying by the defendants in order to
prove infringement of either the distribution or display rights, neither
right may be infringed without proof of unauthorized copying by another
party. These rights simply help copyright owners to enforce their
copyrights against parties who profit from others’ unauthorized copying.
In the case of the distribution right, copyright owners may enforce their
rights against distributors of unauthorized copies who did not themselves
make the copies. Similarly, the display right enables copyright holders to

210. See supra note 17.
211. See supra note 18.
212. See supra note 19.
213. Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47
PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1214 (1986).
214. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 (codified primarily at 17
U.S.C. § 106A).
215. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997). The court noted,
If Lee (and the ninth circuit) are right about what counts as a derivative work, then the
United States has established through the back door an extraordinarily broad version of
authors’ moral rights, under which artists may block any modification of their works of
which they disapprove. . . . It would not be sound to use § 106(2) to provide artists with
exclusive rights deliberately omitted from the Visual Artists Rights Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
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prohibit the subsequent display of unauthorized copies.216 In effect, the
distribution and display rights do not prohibit unauthorized uses, but
rather uses of unauthorized copies. Thus, infringement of every exclusive
right requires some proof that either the defendant or a third party
copied.
In summary, evidence of copying has always been an element of
copyright infringement. Significantly, this conclusion was reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,217 which was decided after enactment of the 1976 Copyright
Act. Although Feist, arguably, only applied to the reproduction right,
Feist’s unequivocal requirement should make evidence of copying
presumptively necessary in derivative-rights cases as well. Few courts
deciding controversies over noncopying alterations, however, have
required plaintiffs alleging infringement of the derivative right to prove
evidence of copying. Some courts have likely ignored the requirement
for copying because many noncopying alterations appear to copy. Future
courts should recognize the difference between modifying a copy and
multiplying a copy. Other courts have likely ignored the requirement for
copying because “copying” has been redefined by some to mean
infringement of any exclusive copyright, including the derivative right.
Future courts should reject this tautology because it obscures the most
fundamental element of any claim for copyright infringement—evidence
of copying! Furthermore, courts should reject attempts to define the
derivative right as prohibiting unauthorized uses of copyrighted works,
thereby granting copyright owners broad claims to “moral rights,” which
Congress deliberately omitted from the Visual Artists Rights Act.
2. “Based upon” implies evidence of copying
In addition to the long-established precedent that copyright
infringement requires evidence of unauthorized copying, the text of the
1976 Copyright Act specifically implies that evidence of copying is
required to prove infringement of the derivative right. There are two
216. In practice, the display right also prohibits copying by the defendants. Section 109(c) of
the Copyright Act limits the scope of the display right by permitting the owners of a particular copy
of a work to display it “to viewers present at the place where the copy is located,” 17 U.S.C. §
109(c), such as an art gallery. The only way to infringe the display right, therefore, is to broadcast
the copy to viewers who are not present where the copy is located. Such a broadcast, in effect, copies
the work in much the same way that a live performance would copy the work.
217. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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relevant sections of the Act: Section 106(2), which defines the exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners, and Section 101, which defines
certain terms used in the Act.
a. Section 106(2) implies evidence of copying. Section 106(2) of the
1976 Copyright Act grants copyright owners “the exclusive right to . . .
prepare derivative works based upon the [owner’s] copyrighted
work.”218 By negative implication, a work is an infringing derivative
work if it is based upon the allegedly infringed copyrighted work. What
does it mean for a derivative work to be “based upon” a copyrighted
work? As demonstrated below, a work is based upon another work only
if it copied that work. Thus, the statutory language, requiring an
infringing derivative work to be based upon the allegedly infringed work,
requires evidence of copying.
At first glance, the “based upon” requirement may appear to
broaden, not limit, the definition of infringing derivative work. After all,
every creative work in one form or another is based upon preexisting
works, as illustrated by Justice Joseph Story’s oft-quoted observation
regarding copyright: “In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there
are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout.”219 Closer scrutiny, however,
reveals several significant limiting factors. For example, because it is
axiomatic that a work may not be based upon itself, the preparation of an
infringing derivative work necessarily requires the creation of another
work in addition to the original work. Next, because an additional work
218. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
219. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436), quoted in 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4. Although Justice Story made his observation
several decades before any legal recognition of an author’s derivative rights, his insights are
nonetheless appreciable. Justice Story continued,
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use
much which was well known and used before. No man creates a new language for
himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a book. He contents himself with the use
of language already known and used and understood by others. No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others.
The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have
thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own
genius or reflection. If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was not new and
original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no ground for any copyright in modern times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to
find a work entitled to such eminence.
Id.
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is not necessarily based upon the original work, the preparation of an
infringing derivative work requires that the additional work embody the
original work, or its elements. Finally, because an independently created
work, even if it embodies the same or similar elements, is not based upon
another work, the preparation of an infringing derivative work requires
evidence that the alleged derivative embodiment was created as a result
of having copied the original work.
There are, therefore, three “based upon” elements: (1) creation of
another work in addition to the original work; (2) embodiment of the
original work in the new work; and (3) evidence of copying.220 It will be
helpful to remember that “copying” is defined as the intentional
multiplication of embodiments of a work.221 Furthermore, it will be
helpful here to recognize that “based upon” is not coterminous with the
concept of copying. Although a work that is based upon another
preexisting work must have copied the preexisting work, copying a
preexisting work does not always lead to a work that is based upon the
preexisting work. A reproduction is not based upon the original work,
even though a reproduction meets the latter “based upon” element—
evidence of copying. A reproduction is not based upon the original work
from which it is copied because a reproduction does not create another
work in addition to the original work—that is, it does not meet the first
“based upon” element; rather the reproduction creates an additional copy
of the original work. Accordingly, a reproduction does not embody the
original work in a new work because there is no new work. Thus, the
second “based upon” element is also not satisfied.
An example illustrates that the three above-mentioned elements are
identifiable in a work that—in common, everyday usage—is based upon
another work. Consider a motion picture version of a novel. Commonly,
the character scripts are based upon the novel’s dialogues; actors’
costumes and film sets are based upon the novel’s descriptions; and
action sequences are based upon the novel’s plots. Often, these motion
220. In a sense, there is only one “based upon” factor—evidence of copying. To copy a work,
there must be another work apart from the original work—that is, the original work cannot copy
itself no matter how much it is altered. Furthermore, to copy a work the second work must embody
the original work in some form. Thus, the “based upon” factors boil down to evidence of copying.
The factors are separated in order to demonstrate the different elements of copying. Here “evidence
of copying” means proof that the second work was created intentionally to appear as the original. In
other words, it means that the creator of the second work had the original work in mind, and
intentionally multiplied its elements, when creating the second work.
221. See supra Part I.
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pictures are preceded by an announcement, such as, “Based upon the
novel by . . .” or “Based upon a true story.” Because a motion picture
version of a novel is based upon that novel, the motion picture version
should meet the three above-identified “based upon” elements. First, a
separate motion picture is another work in addition to the original work,
the novel. Second, a motion picture version of a novel by definition
embodies the elements of the original novel; otherwise it would not be
called a version of the novel. Third, a motion picture version of a novel
cannot be created but for the copying of the elements of the novel into
the movie; an independently created motion picture that coincidentally
embodied elements of the novel would not be called a version of the
novel.
By definition, noncopying alterations do not meet the third “based
upon” element—evidence of copying. Is it possible, however, for a work
to be based upon another work without having copied it? In other words,
is evidence of copying a necessary element for one work to be based
upon another work? The discussion below answers this question by way
of example. In the following discussion, examples of three types of
noncopying alterations—alternative displays, alternative configurations,
and compound works—will be discussed. In each example, common,
everyday use of the phrase “based upon” suggests that these noncopying
alterations are not based upon the respective preexisting works; instead,
they are the respective preexisting works, albeit altered copies of them.
Because all of the noncopying alterations identified in Part III fall into
one of these three categories (or combinations of them), there is a
reasonable inference that there are no noncopying alterations that are
based upon preexisting works. Accordingly, as it is reasonably inferred
that noncopying alterations cannot be based upon preexisting works, it is
further inferred that evidence of copying is a necessary element for one
work to be based upon another work.
(1) Alternative displays and alternative configurations are not
based upon preexisting works. Several examples demonstrate that neither
alternative displays nor alternative configurations of a work, two types of
noncopying alterations, are based upon that work.
Consider the example of an alternative display of a motion picture
viewed on a home video. Most, if not all, entertainment systems include
functions that allow consumers to alter the display of home-video
versions of motion pictures during real-time playback. For instance, the
volume of a video soundtrack may be increased or decreased, or muted
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altogether. Similarly, segments of a video may be viewed in fast forward
or reverse. Additionally, segments may be skipped entirely by stopping
play and skipping ahead or behind. These alternative playbacks,
however, are not based upon the original motion picture. A motion
picture viewed without the soundtrack is not based upon that motion
picture—it is that motion picture, albeit a silent showing of it. A motion
picture viewed with certain scenes played in fast forward is not based
upon that motion picture—it is that motion picture, albeit a fastforwarded showing of it. Everyday, commonplace usage of the phrase
“based upon” resists application to these alternative means of displaying
the work, suggesting that these noncopying alterations are not based
upon the motion picture.
Accordingly, these alternative displays should fail to meet at least
one of the three “based upon” factors. Indeed, they fail to meet all three
requirements. Because there is only one work, the motion picture, it goes
without saying that there are not multiple works. In other words, an
alternative display of a work does not create another work in addition to
the original work. Because there is no new work in addition to the
preexisting work, the two remaining “based upon” elements also are not
satisfied. With regards to the second element, a new work cannot
embody an original work if there is no new work. Although the creation
of a new work is not necessary to meet the third requirement of copying,
there must at least be a new copy of the original work, which is also
absent here. Thus, alternative displays of a work do not meet any of the
three identified “based upon” elements.
What is the difference between a motion picture version of a novel,
which is based upon a preexisting work, and a muted or fast-forwarded
display of a motion picture? More specifically, is not a motion picture
version of a novel similarly just an alternative version for displaying the
original expression embodied by the novel? In an abstract sense, a
motion picture version might be described as an alternative display of the
novel, but it is also much more. A motion picture version of a novel is a
new work (the motion picture) that “recasts, transforms, and adapts”222 a
preexisting work (the novel). In contrast, the alternative versions for
motion picture playback described above—muting sound or fast
forwarding scenes—are not new works, but rather alternative displays of

222. The phrase “recasts, transforms, and adapts” is a reference to the definition of derivative
work provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which is discussed in detail below.
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copies of the original work. An alternative display of a work is not based
upon that work—it is that work, albeit displayed differently.
Another example demonstrates that an alternative configuration of a
work, another type of noncopying alteration, is also not based upon that
work. Consider many popular toys and games that are configurable—that
is, their parts may be rearranged during play. For example, some toys
consist of basic building blocks and other shapes that may be configured
to build models of complex machines, buildings, etc. Similarly, many
dolls have detachable parts, clothes, and accessories that may be
arranged differently. More complex toys, such as video games, have a
database of sounds and images that may be rearranged during game play
according to the decisions of the game player. Many of these toys and
their elements are copyrightable. An alternative configuration of a toy,
however, is not based upon that toy—it is that toy, albeit configured
differently. Everyday, commonplace usage of the phrase “based upon”
resists being applied to describe alternative configurations of toys,
suggesting that these noncopying alterations are not based upon the toys.
Accordingly, these alternative displays should fail to meet at least one of
the three “based upon” factors. Indeed, they fail to meet all three.
Alternative configurations, similar to alternative displays, do not create
another work in addition to the original work, which eliminates the
possibility of meeting either of the first two “based upon” elements.
Additionally, there is no evidence of copying, the third “based upon”
element.
Arguably, some alternative displays and some alternative
configurations may add sufficient original expression to create a new
work, thereby meeting the first “based upon” factor, and most likely the
second factor. In these kinds of noncopying alterations—defined below
as compound works—however, there is not necessarily any evidence of
copying, even though the works are created with copies of other works.
Unauthorized compound works, therefore, are not necessarily infringing
derivative works. As demonstrated below, an unauthorized compound
work is not an infringing derivative work unless there is evidence of
copying.
(2) Compound works are also not based upon preexisting works.
Some noncopying alterations add sufficient expression such that the
resultant alteration is a new work. In other words, copies of preexisting
works may become the building blocks, or raw materials, for the creation
of new works. For purposes of this Comment, a work that is created by
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assembling altered copies of other works is called a compound work—
that is, a work created with copies of other works. Here it is important to
distinguish between two ways in which one work may be created from
another work. In the first instance, an author may create another work
from an original work by copying recognizable elements of an original
work into an embodiment separate from the original work. In the second
instance, an author may create another work with copies of an original
work. In other words, a work may be created by using copies of
preexisting works as the building blocks, or raw materials, of the new
work. These compound works are not based upon the works from which
they were created because they do not meet the “based upon”
requirement for evidence of copying. Accordingly, unauthorized
compound works are not based upon their component works and,
therefore, are not infringing derivative works.
An example is illustrative. A few years ago, digital computer
technology made it possible to easily arrange a collage of pictures,
which, taken as a whole, created an independent image.223 Consider an
artist who purchases a collection of digital images—perhaps a collection
of images from the movie Star Wars marketed for use as computer
screensavers or for computer-desktop backgrounds—and who is granted
rights only to a single digital copy of each image. Consider further that
this artist uses a software collage program to arrange this collection of
purchased images such that, taken as a whole, the resultant collage
creates the image of one of the artist’s own copyrighted works. This is an
example of a compound work—a work created with copies of other
original works. In essence, the artist used copies of copyrighted images
as the building blocks, or raw materials, for a new work—the collage.
Rather than creating a painting using watercolors or oils, this artist
created an original work of art using copies of other artists’ works. Has
this artist prepared a work based upon other artists’ works? No. Even
though the resultant collage is created with copies of other original
works, it is not based upon those works—it is those works, albeit a
compound work made with copies of those works. In an analogous
manner, an automobile is not based upon its parts—it is its parts, or
rather it is comprised of its parts. Everyday, commonplace usage of the

223. To create the independent image, many collage software programs use one picture as a
template and arrange the images in the collage such that the predominant color tone of each image
placed in the collage matches the same color tone of the relative portion of the template image.
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phrase “based upon” resists application to describe compound works, as
it resists application to describe an automobile composition of parts.
Accordingly, a compound work, the collage in this example, should
fail to meet at least one of the three “based upon” elements. Because the
collage contains its own original expression—the arrangement of
preexisting images such that an independent image is formed by their
arrangement—in addition to the expression embodied in the preexisting
images, the collage is a new work. The collage, therefore, meets the first
“based upon” requirement—creation of another work in addition to the
original work. It also meets the second “based upon” requirement—
embodiment of the original work in the new work. Because the new
work, the collage, comprises copies of the original works, it necessarily
embodies those works. Those works are not embodied in the new work,
however, as a result of copying, so the collage fails to meet the third
“based upon” requirement—evidence of copying. This point is subtle.
The new work embodies the original works because it was created with
copies of those works, not because it copied those works. The collage,
therefore, is not a derivative work of its component images.224 The
collage is not based upon its component images any more than an
automobile is based upon its parts; instead, the collage, similar to the
automobile, is based upon its design—that is, the image forming the
basis for the arrangement of the component parts.
A compound work, however, may be an infringing derivative work if
it copied, without authorization, from another work. Consider another
example of an artist who purchases a collection of Star Wars movie
images. In the example above, the artist arranged the images in order to
create an independent embodiment of one of the artist’s own copyrighted
works. Had the artist, instead, intentionally arranged the images in order
to resemble a copyrighted work, such as an image of a popular character
from Star Wars, then the resulting collage would be a derivative work of
the copied Star Wars image. In this case, the resultant collage would
meet the third “based upon” requirement—evidence of copying.
b. Section 101 also implies evidence of copying. Until this point, only
Section 106(2)—which defines an infringing derivative work, by
224. Although this collage is not a derivative work of the component images, it is a derivative
work of the artist’s own copyrighted image. Of course, if the artist reproduced the individual images
by printing the collage, the artist would have infringed the copyrights of the owners of the
component images.
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negative implication, as an unauthorized work based upon a copyrighted
work—has been addressed. The Copyright Act, however, expressly
defines a “derivative work” in Section 101, as follows:
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
“derivative work.”225

Similar to Section 106(2), this definition repeats the “based upon”
requirement. In addition, the Section 101 definition adds two lists of
nonexhaustive examples, as well as a catchall phrase, in order to further
clarify what it means for one work to be based upon another work. If the
phrase “based upon” indeed implies evidence of copying, as advocated in
Part IV.A.2.a, then the listed examples of works that are “based upon”
other works, as well as the catchall phrase, must all be capable of being
created as the result of some form of copying—that is, the intentional
multiplication of embodiments of an original work.
Beginning with the first list, little explanation is required to
demonstrate that translations, musical arrangements, dramatizations,
fictionalizations, motion picture versions, sound recordings, and art
reproductions intentionally multiply embodiments of original
expression—that is, copy. For instance, a translation is, by definition, an
intentional multiplication of an embodiment of the original text into a
new language. Similarly, a sound recording is an intentional
multiplication of an embodiment of a live musical performance into a
reproducible medium. In each case, the resultant derivative work is based
upon the preexisting work from which it was copied. It is difficult to
hypothesize creating any of the above examples without some form of
copying.
The inclusion of abridgments and condensations, however, requires a
more searching explanation. Arguably, abridgments and condensations
may be created without any copying. For instance, a secondhand
bookseller might excise with a thick, black marker certain lengthy
portions of popular novels, marketing these excised copies as “abridged”
225. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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or “condensed” versions. Thus, the may statute include abridgments and
condensations that are the result of alteration, rather than of copying.
Several observations suggest, however, that the statute refers to
copy-based, rather than alteration-based, abridgments and condensations.
First, most commercially produced abridgments and condensations are
distributed as stand-alone copies of the abbreviated versions, not as
excised copies of the original. The statutory definition, therefore, likely
refers to these kinds of abridgments and condensations. In response, it
might be argued that it would be unnecessary to include these standalone abridgments and condensations in the list of example derivative
works because the reproduction right would protect authors against the
reproduction of those portions of an original text that were included in
abbreviated versions. By implication, it might further be argued that the
statutory definition, therefore, specifically contemplated noncopying
abridgments and condensations—created by means of direct alteration—
in order to extend protection beyond the limits of the reproduction right.
This argument, however, ignores the fact that many, if not most,
abridgments and condensations require rewritten, and even additional,
text in order to transition over the excised portions.226 Abridging or
condensing works requires much more effort than merely reproducing
those portions of the text that are chosen for abbreviated versions,
including effort to rewrite the style, organization, and content of
sentences, paragraphs, and chapters. If a certain event or character is
excised in the process of abbreviation, then any reference to that event or
character must be removed from all of the otherwise unmolested portions
of the text. This may require extensive rewriting in order to make the
omission unnoticeable. In each case that the abridgment or condensation
rewrites original text, the abridgment or condensation must necessarily
copy the style, organization, and content of the original text.
Having observed that abridgments and condensations require
significant rewriting, it is reasonable to conclude that the reproduction
right protects against the unauthorized copying of intact portions of a
text, and that the derivative right protects against the unauthorized
copying of style, organization, and content of a text. Accordingly, the
inclusion of abridgments and condensations under the derivative right

226. Admittedly, no attempt is made here to prove this point by way of evidence, not even
anecdotal; instead, the argument is based on hypothesizing the necessary steps in the process of
abridgment or condensation.
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does not infer that the definition of derivative right includes noncopying
alterations. Consistent with common practice, the preparation of
abridgments and condensations typically requires evidence of copying.
Similarly, the inclusion of the broad, catchall phrase—“any . . . form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”—does not infer
that the derivative right includes noncopying alterations because works
may be “recast,” “transformed,” or “adapted” as a result of copying. In
fact, with regards to the term “recast,” it appears that only copying
alterations would fit the description. Derived from the process of casting
or molding, the term “recast,” in the copyright context, suggests creating
a new work from the copied cast or mold of a preexisting work. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine how a work could be “recast” without some
evidence of copying.
The terms “transformed” and “adapted,” however, may be
interpreted to include both copying and noncopying alterations.
Admittedly, these terms are commonly used without connoting any
concept of copying. For instance, a child might adapt a bicycle helmet
for use with a Halloween costume by attaching various decorative
embellishments. Similarly, a family might transform their garage into a
guestroom by painting and adding carpet. In both cases, the described
alteration required no element of copying. The terms “adapt” and
“transform,” however, may also be used to indicate copying alterations.
For instance, a musician might adapt a piece of music by rewriting it for
a different set of voices and/or instruments. Similarly, an artist might
transform a watercolor painting by repainting it with oils. In both cases,
the described activity required the intentional multiplication of
embodiments of the original work—that is, copying.
Apparently, the potentially broad application of the terms
“transformed” and “adapted” has formed the primary basis for
interpreting the derivative right to include noncopying alterations.227
Interpreting “transformed” and “adapted” broadly, however, ignores the
“based upon” requirement. The 1976 Copyright Act did not define
derivative works to be any work that “recast, transformed, or adapted” a
previous work; rather, the Act defined derivative works to be works that
are based upon preexisting works in such a way that the resulting work
“recast, transformed, or adapted” the preexisting work. Thus, although

227. For a detailed description of how some courts have arrived at the conclusion that
noncopying alterations infringe the derivative right, see Part III.B.
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the terms “transformed” and “adapted” might be interpreted to include
certain noncopying alterations, such alterations are not based upon
preexisting works. With reference to the above examples, a bicycle
helmet adapted for use with a Halloween costume is not based upon the
original, unaltered helmet—it is that helmet, albeit adapted for another
use with decorative attachments. Similarly, a garage that is transformed
into a guestroom is not based upon the original, unaltered garage—it is
that garage, albeit transformed with the addition of paint and carpet.
Stated simply, the catchall phrase in the Section 101 definition is
only as broad as the interpretation of the “based upon” requirement. In
other words, the catchall phrase must be interpreted in light of the “based
upon” requirement. The inclusion of the broad, catchall phrase, therefore,
does not infer that derivative works include noncopying alterations.
Interpreting the catchall phrase to be limited to instances of copying is
internally consistent because each of the terms in the catchall phrase may
refer to activities requiring copying. Thus, interpreting the phrase “based
upon” to require evidence of copying—as advocated in Part IV.B.2.a—is
not inconsistent with the first list of examples and the accompanying
catchall phrase in the Section 101 definition of “derivative work.”
Interpreting “based upon” to require some form of copying is also
consistent with the second list of examples in the Section 101 definition,
though the point is more subtle. The second sentence of the definition
lists editorial “revisions,” “annotations,” and “elaborations” as examples
of derivative works, with the condition that these editorial modifications
are sufficiently original when taken as a whole. At first glance, copying
does not appear to be an element of any of these examples. Moreover,
the definition continues, listing “other modifications, which as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship” as examples of derivative
works. Because originality is partly defined as the absence of copying,228
the second list appears to expressly contemplate noncopying
modifications to be within the scope of the derivative right. From this
initial perspective, the interpretation of “based upon” as requiring
evidence of copying appears to be in jeopardy. Upon closer examination,
however, editorial “revisions,” “annotations,” and “elaborations” likely
require some form of copying, and the broad phrase “other

228. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The other element is a
modicum of creativity. Id.
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modifications” should be interpreted in light of these examples to include
only copying modifications.
Editors do not edit from scratch. Editorial revisions, much like
rewritten sentences from abridgments and condensations, likely copy the
style, organization, and content of the original text. Similarly, editorial
annotations and elaborations depend upon the original text for context.
These annotations and elaborations likely copy portions of the original
text in order to transition into the new material being added or to refer to
the original. The physics solutions at issue in Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co. v. Brown229 provide a helpful example. Editorial annotations and
elaborations likely paraphrase the original texts that they complement in
a similar fashion that the physics solutions in Addison-Wesley
paraphrased the original problems.230 Admittedly, some annotations and
elaborations may not paraphrase or otherwise copy the texts that they
complement, resting instead as freestanding additions to the original
texts. These annotations and elaborations, however, are not properly
described as editorial.231 Thus, each of the three enumerated examples of
editorial modifications likely requires some form of copying. Because
the context of “other modifications” suggests that the broad phrase refers
to other editorial modifications, any elements common to the three
enumerated examples are reasonably imputed to the interpretation of the
otherwise open-ended phrase. Accordingly, the phrase “other
modifications” should be interpreted to include only copying
modifications, as the three enumerated examples all include an element
of copying.
In summary, the definition of “derivative work,” found in Section
101 of the Copyright Act, is consistent with interpreting the phrase
“based upon” to signify the existence of copying. In other words, the
Section 101 definition of “derivative work” is consistent with requiring

229. 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
230. For more on Addison-Wesley, see notes 54–57.
231. If this distinction is judged to be too fine, there is another way to reconcile the second
sentence of the “derivative work” definition with an interpretation of “based upon” that requires
evidence of copying. It may be the case that the first sentence defines the “based upon” derivative
works, and that the second sentence defines a very narrow category of editorial modifications that
may include noncopying alterations, such as annotations and elaborations that are completely
independent of the original text. This interpretation does not disturb the general conclusion of this
Comment—that noncopying alterations do not prepare infringing derivative works—but rather crafts
a very narrow exception for certain noncopying editorial modifications.
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evidence of copying before finding infringement of the Section 106(2)
derivative right.
B. Application to Controversies
Although holding noncopying alterations not to infringe the
derivative right is contrary to at least two federal appellate court
precedents,232 those decisions are either much maligned, generally
misunderstood, and/or directly in conflict with the holdings of other
circuits. Thus, requiring evidence of copying does not require a
significant course change in federal case law. Even more importantly,
this requirement would result in more consistent and predictable
outcomes for present and future litigation over noncopying alterations,
avoiding the need for narrow legislative exemptions, such as the Family
Movie Act of 2005.233 This Section first examines each of the two
federal appellate court decisions that squarely hold examples of
noncopying alterations to infringe the derivative right, demonstrating that
neither holding merits continued deference. This Section then examines
how the video-filtering controversy might have been resolved without
congressional intervention, which appears to have been initiated as a
direct result of the contradictory case law surrounding noncopying
alterations.
1. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.
If, as advocated in this Comment, evidence of copying is required to
prove infringement of the derivative right, then Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
232. The Ninth Circuit holding in Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998),
may also be subject to review. Because the facts relevant to a determination of copying are difficult
to discern from the opinion, a detailed discussion of the case is omitted here. Briefly, the question is
whether the user-built MAP files—which contained instructions for building video-game levels
comprising copyrighted images from the source art library—copied any of the plaintiff’s distributed
video-game level designs. From one perspective, the MAP files contain only reference and index
information that does not copy any of the plaintiff’s expression. From another perspective, however,
the MAP files are sufficiently detailed—and the user-built levels sufficiently similar to the
distributed, proprietary game levels—such that the user-built MAP files copy the style, structure, and
organization of the original game levels. Because the Ninth Circuit did not specifically address the
issue of copying to arrive at its decision, the description of the facts does not provide sufficient detail
to determine whether any copying occurred—that is, whether the game users’ personal game levels
copied the game manufacturer’s originally distributed game levels. For more on Micro Star, see
supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.
233. Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110,
15 U.S.C. § 1114).
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Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.234 and its progeny should be disavowed. As
demonstrated by the following, many courts and commentators have
already criticized Mirage; their reasons, however, are not consistent. If
courts require evidence of copying before finding infringement of the
derivative right, then Mirage and its progeny may be safely disavowed
on a consistent basis.
Of all the noncopying, static alteration decisions, Mirage is the most
heavily criticized by courts235 and commentators236 alike. Critics
generally agree that the holding of Mirage—that is, that affixing lawfully
purchased copies of a work onto ceramic tiles creates derivative works of
that work—interprets the derivative right much too broadly, opening the
door, as one court described, “for the most trivial of modifications to
generate an infringing derivative work.”237 If, as Mirage held, permanent
affixation to ceramic tile creates a “new version” of the original work,
then any permanent alteration to a copy of a work would create a
derivative work, including, for example, framing, cropping, or
labeling.238 Although such alterations, arguably, “transform” the work, it
234. 856 F.2d 1341 (1988). For more on Mirage, see supra notes 72–77.
235. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581–82 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing
with Mirage and describing scholarly disapproval as “widespread”), aff’g, Lee v. Deck the Walls,
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576, 578–79 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (declining to follow Mirage and citing
scholarly disapproval); Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 66, 68–69 (D.
Puerto Rico 1997) (declining to follow Mirage and citing judicial and scholarly disapproval); see
also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan. 1989)
(distinguishing Mirage and holding no infringement for noncopying affixation of advertisements to
videocassette tape).
236. See, e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, § 5.3, at 5:84 to :84-1; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 8, § 3.03[B][1], at 3-16 to -17; WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
823–24 (1994), cited in Lee, 125 F.3d at 582; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 255 n.401 (1992).
237. Precious Moments, 971 F. Supp. at 69.
238. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We asked at oral
argument what would happen if a purchaser jotted a note on one of the note cards, or used it as a
coaster for a drink, or cut it in half, or if a collector applied his seal (as is common in Japan); Lee’s
counsel replied that such changes prepare derivative works, but that as a practical matter artists
would not file suit.”). The Seventh Circuit further observed, “A definition of derivative work that
makes criminals out of art collectors and tourists is jarring despite Lee’s gracious offer not to
commence civil litigation.” Id.
Whether tile art is akin to framing has been a topic of much debate. In Muñoz v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993) (defendant art company mounted plaintiff’s
copyrighted works onto ceramic tiles), aff’d, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion), the
district court distinguished tile art from framing on the basis that framing is merely “a method of
display,” which was easily reversible. Id. at 314. The Seventh Circuit found such reasoning to be “a
distinction without a difference” and, moreover, refuted the conclusion that “normal means of
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is doubtful that Congress intended, in the words of the Seventh Circuit,
“[to] make[] criminals out of art collectors and tourists.”239
Although many courts and commentators agree that the derivative
right should be interpreted to eliminate the kind of alteration at issue in
Mirage from the scope of the derivative right, critics of Mirage have not
agreed on the appropriate “limiting doctrine.”240 Some commentators
conclude that the creation of tile art is not an infringing derivative work
because the alteration is not sufficiently original.241 Beginning from the
assumption that a derivative work must be copyrightable in order to
infringe, these commentators conclude that the affixation of art works to
ceramic tiles constitutes insufficient original expression, one of the
requirements for a work to be copyrightable, and, therefore, conclude
that tile art is not an infringing derivative work.242 Some commentators,
however, disagree that a work must be copyrightable in order to
infringe.243
Distinguishing infringing and noninfringing works on the basis of
originality, however, leads to counterintuitive results. If only original

mounting and displaying art are easily reversible.” Lee, 125 F.3d at 581. Prominent commentators
likewise find little difference between tile art and traditional picture framing. See, e.g., 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, § 5.3, at 5:84 to :84-1; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.03[B][1],
at 3-16 to -17.
239. Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
240. The term “limiting doctrine” is borrowed from Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature
of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 62–63
(2000) (“Recognizing that almost all works are, in a broad sense, based upon preexisting works,
courts have attempted to confine the application of the derivative work right through limiting
doctrines, including requiring the work either to be substantially similar to the copyrighted work or
to substantially incorporate protectable material from the underlying work.” (internal citation
omitted)). Although Professor Loren’s article only addresses dynamic alterations, the description of
courts’ attempts to reign in the definition of the derivative right applies generally to all derivative
rights cases, including static alterations.
241. See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.03[B][1], at 3-16 to -17.
242. Id.
243. The Seventh Circuit, in Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997), noted the
apparently equally divided debate, and deliberately sidestepped it. Id. at 582. Finding the question
unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the court rested its decision on the fact that the tile art
process does not “transform” the original work because the resultant tile art “still depicts exactly
what it depicted” before affixation. Id. Lee, however, is internally inconsistent. In discussing
hypothetical examples raised during oral argument, Lee implied that writing on a work, cutting a
work in half, or applying a seal to the face of work should all be permissible alterations. Id. Each of
these alterations, however, arguably transforms that work, under the reasoning of Lee, because, in
each case, the altered work no longer “depicts exactly what it depicted” before the alteration. Lee’s
holding, therefore, is unworkable.
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alterations are found infringing, there is no incentive for investing in
original expression, the very purpose of copyright. This result is best
observed by way of example. It is generally agreed that framing an
artwork does not prepare an infringing derivative work. Advocates of
limiting the derivative right on the basis of originality would argue that a
simple frame does not add sufficient expression to amount to the
preparation of a derivative work. Should a more creative and, therefore,
original frame, however, be prohibited as an infringing derivative work?
If, instead of using a simple framing technique, a subsequent artist
framed and matted another artist’s work in an elaborate and expressive
manner, should the subsequent artist be prohibited from adding original
expression? Public policy answers this question in the negative. In
accordance with the fundamental purpose of copyright, the addition of
original expression should not be discouraged unless preexisting
expression is copied in the process.
Instead of attempting to limit the derivative right on the basis of lack
of originality, courts and commentators should recognize the most
fundamental purpose of copyright to be the prevention of unauthorized
copying—that is, the unauthorized, intentional multiplication of
embodiments of a protected work. Regardless of whether an alteration is
sufficiently original, it should not be infringing unless it copied the
original work. Although the Seventh Circuit, in Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,244 did
not rest its holding on the requirement for evidence of copying, the court
succinctly observed the underlying economic basis for such a
requirement:
Because the artist could capture the value of her art’s contribution to
the finished product as part of the price for the original transaction, the
economic rationale for protecting an adaptation as ‘derivative’ is
absent. An alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of
the original lacks economic significance.245

Affixation to ceramic tile is, in essence, an alternative display or
configuration of a work. As described in Part IV.A.2.a(1), alternative
displays and configurations are not based upon preexisting works—they
are those works. A work that has been altered, by affixing it to a ceramic
backing, is not based upon that work—it is that work, albeit in a different
244. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). For more on the precise holding of Lee, see supra note 243.
245. Id. at 581 (internal citation omitted) (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 325, 353–57 (1989)).
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format. Similarly, a picture in a frame is not based upon that picture—it
is that picture, albeit surrounded by a frame. Requiring evidence of
copying affords an everyday, commonsense meaning to the definition of
an infringing derivative work as a work based upon preexisting works.
Because tile art is not based upon the preexisting artwork that is affixed
to the tile, tile art does not prepare infringing derivative works. Mirage,
therefore, should be disavowed.
2. Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.
In contrast to the widespread criticism of Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,246 courts and commentators have generally
accepted the holding in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International, Inc.247 This result is odd because both Mirage and Artic
adopt the same underlying holding that the derivative right prohibits even
noncopying alterations. The disparity likely arises from a
misunderstanding of the facts at issue in Artic. At least one decision,
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,248 has
characterized Artic as addressing copying alterations. Similar to the
“Galaxian” circuit boards at issue in Artic, the Game Genie in Lewis
Galoob Toys speeded up the play of the plaintiff’s video game.249 Lewis
Galoob Toys, however, distinguished the infringing “Galaxian” circuit
boards in Artic from the noninfringing “Game Genie” because the
“Galaxian” circuit boards: (1) copied the original boards, (2) replaced—
and, therefore, supplanted demand for—the original boards, and (3) were
offered for use by the general public.250 The first distinction is factually
incorrect, and the latter two are without difference.
First, although Artic did not address in its discussion the differences
between the defendant’s two sets of circuit boards, a careful reading of
the facts indicates that the “Pac-Man” circuit boards copied an original
work, while the “Galaxian” circuit boards did not. In explaining the facts,
the court wrote:
246. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). For more on the criticism of Mirage, see supra notes 235–
236 and accompanying text.
247. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant manufactured replacement circuit boards to
speed up plaintiff’s video game).
248. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
249. Id. at 969. For more on Artic, see supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. For more on
Lewis Galoob Toys, see supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text.
250. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 969.
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Defendant sells printed circuit boards for use inside video game
machines. One of the circuit boards defendant sells speeds up the rate
of play—how fast the sounds and images change—of “Galaxian,” one
of plaintiff’s video games, when inserted in place of one of the
“Galaxian” machine’s circuit boards. Another of defendant’s circuit
boards stores a set of images and sounds almost identical to that stored
in the circuit boards of plaintiff’s “Pac-Man” video game machine so
that the video game people play on machines containing defendant’s
circuit boards looks and sounds virtually the same as plaintiff’s “PacMan” game.251

Thus, Lewis Galoob Toys incorrectly confused the “Galaxian” boards,
which merely speeded-up game play, with the “Pac-Man” boards, which
stored “a set of images and sounds almost identical to that stored in the
circuit boards of plaintiff’s ‘Pac-Man’ video game machine.”252 The
“Pac-Man” boards plainly copied, whereas the “Galaxian” boards merely
altered. At least one respected commentator has repeated Lewis Galoob
Toys’ misunderstanding of the facts.253
This distinction, however, is crucial. Finding the “Pac-Man” circuit
boards to be infringing was an uncontroversial application of copyright
to protect the “look” and “sound” of the plaintiff’s audiovisual work.254
These circuit boards copied the plaintiff’s work by storing and generating
“a set of images and sounds almost identical to that stored in the circuit
boards of the plaintiff’s ‘Pac-Man’ video game machine.”255 In stark
contrast, finding the “Galaxian” circuit boards to be infringing was a
novel extension of copyright to protect mere alterations to copyrighted
works even absent evidence of copying. The “Galaxian” circuit boards
did not store any of the plaintiff’s copyrighted images or sounds. Instead,
the boards speeded up the rate of play—“how fast the sounds and images
change.” Because these boards merely interacted with, and did not
recreate, the plaintiff’s video game, the “Galaxian” boards did not copy
the plaintiff’s work. Instead, the “Galaxian” boards temporarily altered
already existing copies of the plaintiff’s work during real-time game
play. In the language of the Copyright Act, a speeded-up video game is

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Artic, 704 F.2d at 1010.
Id. at 1010–11.
See, e.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 8.03[B][1], at 3-16 to -17.
See supra note 92.
Artic, 704 F.2d at 1010–11.
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not based upon that game—it is that game, albeit configured in real-time
to play differently.
In addition to distinguishing Artic on the grounds of copying, Lewis
Galoob Toys also distinguished Artic because the “Galaxian” circuit
boards replaced the plaintiff’s boards and because these boards, along
with the rest of the arcade game, were offered for general use by the
public. Both distinctions are correct, but without difference.
Unlike the separately installable Game Genie, the “Galaxian” boards
replaced the original boards and, to a limited degree, supplanted demand
for the plaintiff’s boards.256 The court gives no reason, however, to
explain why replacement parts, as opposed to purely complementary
parts, are infringing derivative works. If the replacement parts copied
protected expression from the original part, then copyright should
prohibit this multiplication of expressive content. The “Galaxian” boards,
however, contained no copyrighted images or sounds; these boards
merely replaced boards that affected how fast the copyrighted sounds and
images, presumably stored on other circuit boards, appeared during game
play. If every altered display of a copyrighted work were found to be
infringing, the consequences would be far reaching, implicating perhaps
even fast-forward and rewind operations for home video players.
Moreover, the Copyright Act makes no such distinction between
replacement and complementary parts. A work that is not based upon a
preexisting work is not a derivative work, regardless of whether it
replaces component parts that generate audiovisual works, even if such
replacements supplant demand for original parts. The same reasoning
applies to the attempt of Lewis Galoob Toys to distinguish Artic on the
basis that the arcade game in Artic was offered for general public use.
The Copyright Act does not distinguish between public and private uses.
A work that is not based upon a preexisting work is not a derivative
work, regardless of whether the work is offered for general public use.
In summary, Lewis Galoob Toys acknowledged Artic’s holding
based on an erroneous understanding of facts. Upon careful comparison
256. Only demand for replacement parts was supplanted. Consumers of the defendant’s
enhancement kit must have previously purchased the entire video arcade unit from the plaintiff.
Conceivably, if the original circuit board needed replacement, a video arcade operator might have
been persuaded to purchase the enhancement kit in lieu of purchasing an original replacement board
from the plaintiff. This scenario seems unlikely. It is more probable that video arcade owners
replaced completely functional boards with the enhancement kit boards. Thus, the “Galaxian” boards
are virtually indistinguishable from the Game Genie because the enhancement kits operate as purely
complementary devices that may even augment demand for the original work.
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of the facts of the two cases, Lewis Galoob Toys appears to be in direct
conflict with Artic. Based on the requirement of copying for
infringement, Lewis Galoob Toys should be followed, and Artic should
be disavowed. Had Lewis Galoob Toys not erred in distinguishing Artic,
it might have directly addressed whether evidence of copying is
necessary to find infringement of the derivative right. As such, it might
have also concluded, in the words of the Copyright Act, that altered
video games are not based upon the unaltered games—they are the
unaltered games, albeit configured in real-time to play differently.
Instead, Lewis Galoob Toys reached its decision by reasoning that the
Game Genie did not “incorporate” a portion of the copyrighted work.257
To avoid an inconsistent result with Lewis Galoob Toys, future courts
requiring evidence of copying before finding infringement of the
derivative right could interpret “incorporate” to mean copy.
3. Home-Video Filtering and the Family Movie Act of 2005
If courts interpret the Copyright Act to require evidence of copying
in order to establish infringement of the derivative right, narrowly
drafted amendments to the Copyright Act, such as the Family Movie Act
of 2005,258 would be unnecessary. Of all the noncopying-alteration
controversies, home-video editing/filtering has likely attracted the most
media attention, including features in popular newspapers,259 radio
programs,260 and television programs.261 Additionally, legal
professionals262 and students263 have already devoted significant
257. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 967–69.
258. Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110,
15 U.S.C. § 1114).
259. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos with the Sex and Violence
Excised, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11(1).
260. See, e.g., John Ydstie & Jacki Lyden, Clean Flicks’ Lawsuit Against 16 A-List Directors,
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Sept. 16, 2002.
261. See, e.g., Matt Lauer, Ray Lines, Owner of CleanFlicks, and Screenwriter Joe Eszterhas
Discuss Editing Sex, Violence, and Profanity from Rental Movies, TODAY, Feb. 1, 2001.
262. See, e.g., Matthew S. Bethards, Can Moral Rights Be Used To Protect Immorality?:
Editing Motion Pictures To Remove Objectionable Content, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003)
(focusing exclusively on video editing); Ochoa, supra note 151, at 1033–44 (discussing, inter alia,
home-video editing).
263. See, e.g., Nicole Griffin Farrell, Comment & Note, Frankly, We Do Give a . . . Darn!
Hollywood’s Battle Against Unauthorized Editing of Motion Pictures: The “CleanFlicks” Case,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 1041 (addressing both trademark and copyright claims in the “CleanFlicks”
case); Michael P. Glasser, Note, “To Clean or Not To Clean”: An Analysis of the Copyright and
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attention to home-video editing/filtering, even though no court has made
a substantive ruling on the issue. Although other alterations to
copyrighted works have evoked the ire of the respective copyright
holders,264 no controversy has approached the intensely emotional debate
surrounding video editing/filtering; professionals in the film industry
have accused video editors/filterers of “stealing,”265 of “vandalism,”266
and even of “creative terror[ism].”267 Owing, at least in part, to the
hostile response to their business practice, a franchisee of the popular
video-editing company, CleanFlicks, filed a preemptory strike against
sixteen Hollywood directors, requesting a declaratory judgment
upholding their video-editing practice.268 In response, the Directors
Guild of America and a group of the largest motion picture studios
countersued the entire video-editing industry, including in the lawsuit
other parties that utilized video-filtering technologies. Video editors and

Trademark Issues Surrounding the Legal Battle Between Third Party Film Editors and the Film
Industry, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 129 (2004) (discussing both trademark and copyright
claims in the “CleanFlicks” case); Ashley Kerns, Note and Comment, Modified To Fit Your Screen:
DVD Playback Technology, Copyright Infringement or Fair Use?, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 483
(2004) (focusing exclusively on noncopying video filtering); Christina Mitakis, Note, The E-Rated
Industry: Fair Use Sheep or Infringing Goat?, 2004 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 291 (focusing on
whether video editing is a fair use of the copyrighted movies); Nikki D. Pope, Comment, Snipping
Private Ryan: The Clean Flicks Fight To Sanitize Movies, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1045 (2004) (focusing on the copyright and trademark claims in the “CleanFlicks” case);
Laura Jeanne Monique Silvey, Comment, Cutting Out the “Good” Parts: The Copyright
Controversy over Creating Sanitized Versions of VHS/DVD Movies, 2004 SW. U. L. REV. 419
(focusing on copyright issues surrounding home-video editing); Philip Vineyard, Comment, “No
One Expects the Spanish Inquisition”—Twice: Subduing the Moral Rights Monster, 6 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 223 (2004) (discussing moral rights in the context of video filtering).
264. For example, the plaintiff in Muñoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D.
Alaska 1993) (defendant art company mounted plaintiff’s copyrighted works onto ceramic tiles),
aff’d, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion), described the appearance of the tile-art as
“tacky.” Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Ray Richmond, Battle Lines Drawn in War over Who Gets To Say “Cut!,” DGA
MAGAZINE,
Nov.
2002,
available
at
http://www.dga.org/news/v27_4/
feat_digitalpiracy2.php3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting movie director Michael Mann).
266. Lauer, supra note 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting screenwriter Joe
Eszterhas).
267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting screenwriter Joe Eszterhas).
268. See Second Amended Complaint at 5–6, Huntsman v. Soderbergh (D. Colo. filed Oct. 28,
2002)
(No.
02-M-1662),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/copyright/
cflixstud102802cmp.pdf; see also, e.g., Anita Chabria, ‘Clean’ Video Store Publicly Attacks DGA,
PR WEEK, Sept. 30, 2002, at 3; Sarah Huntley, Rental Firm a Cut Above Directors?, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 30, 2002, at 30A.
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video filterers, however, use techniques that should result in different
consequences under copyright law.
In the formative years of the industry, video editors simply cut from
videocassette tapes those portions with scenes and dialogue deemed
objectionable.269 Although video-editing companies, including those
who are parties to the pending lawsuit, may have originally practiced this
simple form of noncopying, static alteration to videocassette tapes, the
movie studio parties have alleged that video editors, including
CleanFlicks, currently make a digital copy of the movie, alter that master
copy with digital editing programs, and then recopy the edited version
onto videocassette tapes or digital video discs.270
Video-filtering companies, however, do not make copies of, but
rather make filters for, copyrighted movies. Video filters mask
predetermined images and sounds during real-time playback. Filters map
each image and sound marked for excision to a particular timing code on
a digital video disc. In a sense, the filter is an index of certain images and
sounds that are stored on the digital video disc. During real-time
playback, the disc reader skips the images and mutes the sounds indexed
by the filter.271 Similar to video-game components and websiteadvertising tools, video filters work in conjunction with (or complement)
the display of copyrighted works.
As discussed, video editing is a complicated controversy that
includes cutting videocassette tape, creating edited versions from
digitally altered master copies, and filtering real-time playback of
original copies. Viewed through the lens of copying, the video
editing/filtering controversy is straightforward. Altered cassette tapes are
not based upon the movies fixed in the unaltered tapes—they are those
movies, albeit in an altered condition. If, however, video editors make a
digital copy of the movies to make their altered copies, then video editors
most likely infringe the reproduction right.272 Filtered playbacks of
269. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, For $5, a Family Video Store Will Cut 2 ‘Titanic’ Scenes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998.
270. See Motion Picture Studio Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims at 14–15, Huntsman
v.
Soderbergh
(D.
Colo.
filed
Dec.
13,
2002)
(No.
02-M-1662),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/copyright/cflixstud121302acc.pdf.
271. For more on video filtering, see Kerns, supra note 263.
272. Video-editing parties may have a defense based on the doctrine of fair use, but this
consideration is beyond the scope of this Comment. Because the Family Movie Act of 2005 did not
exempt video editing, litigation is still pending against the video-editing parties. See, e.g., Accola,
supra note 149.
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movies, similar to altered cassette tapes, are not based upon the
unfiltered movies—they are those movies, albeit filtered to remove
certain content. If courts had consistently required proof of copying to
prove infringement of the derivative right, the litigation surrounding
video editing/filtering would have been a straightforward examination
for evidence of copying. Instead, the outcome of the litigation was
uncertain, and Congress specifically intervened to exempt the practice of
video-filtering. If courts begin emphasizing the copy in copyright by
requiring evidence of copying to prove infringement of the derivative
right, future intervention by Congress to exempt other noncopying
alterations will be unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, an increasing
number of plaintiffs have alleged copyright infringement even absent
evidence of copying. Although evidence of copying is a well-established
requirement for proving copyright infringement in general—affirmed
most recently in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.273—courts have not directly addressed whether copying is an
element to prove infringement of the derivative right. Even in its most
narrow reading, Feist’s holding, which is arguably dictum as applied to
the derivative right, should at least be enough for courts to conclude that
evidence of copying is presumptively required for the derivative right
(which grew out of the reproduction right), leaving it to the Court to
further clarify. In addition, the “based upon” requirement in the
definition of an infringing derivative work implies that evidence of
copying is necessary to prove infringement. Observing that mere altered
copies of works (either static or dynamic) are not based upon those
works—but rather are those works—this Comment concludes that
noncopying alterations do not prepare infringing derivative works.
Michael K. Erickson∗
273. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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